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"We Buy Houses": A Foreclosure Rescue as
the Solution to the Trapped Homeowner
Equity Problem
Cori Harvey*
1. INTRODUCTION
Foreclosure rescue transactions are viewed widely as scams designed,
among other things, to dupe poor, minority, and elderly homeowners out of
the equity in their homes. 1 The transactions are frequently called "foreclosure
rescue scams.t" "equity skimming schemes.t" or other derogatory terms.
However, foreclosure rescue transactions come in many forms and, as an
alternative to foreclosure, often maintain valuable options for homeowners
that the homeowners otherwise would lose in the traditional foreclosure pro-
cess.
4 For this reason, many of these transactions, though imperfect, should
be preserved and supported.
This Article introduces one such foreclosure rescue transaction, the resi-
dential sale/leaseback/buyback ("RSLB") transaction, into the legal literature
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida A&M College of Law. Author acknowledges
and thanks Peter Carstensen for his help with the heavy lifting. Author extends an
additional thank you to Oren Bar-Gill, Donald Joseph, Heinz Klug, and Stewart Ma-
caulay for their thoughtful and insightful comments and conversations. Author thanks
the investors who offered over one hundred hours of interviews for this project. Au-
thor also thanks the participants of the 2013 International Conference on Contracting,
the 2013 University of Wisconsin Junior Faculty Workshop, the Southeast Associa-
tion of Law Schools Conference, attendees at the George Mason Law & Economics
Institute for Law Professors, Lua Yuille, Casey Faucon, research assistant Michael
Boshardy, and the Missouri Law Review editorial board for their comments on the
ideas presented here.
1. See Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Equity Stripping: Legal Theories and Strate-
gies to Attack a Growing Problem, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 607, 609 (2005-2006);
Nathaniel C. Nichols, Home Alone: Home Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Scams and
the Theft of Equity, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 280, 280
(2002).
2. See Cox, supra note 1, at 609,621; Nichols, supra note 1, at 280.
3. See Cox, supra note 1, at 607; Nichols, supra note 1, at 280.
4. See generally John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Foreclosing a Dream: State Laws
Deprive Homeowners ofBasic Protections, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CENTER (Feb. 2009),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-foreclosing-dream. pdf (finding that
state foreclosure law facilitates the loss of homes and equity to big lenders during the
foreclosure process by weak civil procedural protections, excessive fee schedules, and
other means).
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from the perspective of the rescue investors' A basic RSLB transaction al-
lows a homeowner facing foreclosure to sell his property to an investor and to
lease the property back for a set period at a set rate, while retaining the right
to buy the property back at a set price on a set date in the future (a call op-
. ) 6tion).
This Article unveils the logic of these transactions and provides market
context, which is often misunderstood and under-appreciated by academics,
5. This Article is the first of a series of articles about residential pre-foreclosure
investing. Specifically, these articles introduce the We Buy Houses transaction and
other RSLB transactions into the legal literature from the previously unheard perspec-
tive of the often demonized investors. The articles are the culmination of over one
hundred hours of interviews with these investors, the bulk of which occurred in Fall
2012 and Spring 2013, including exclusive interviews and written correspondence
with the first-ever white-collar defendant, an RSLB investor, sentenced under a
Three-Strikes Rule to a potential life sentence for this type of transaction.
The anatomy of the transaction presented in this series of articles is a compo-
site of their descriptions, theorized and converted into the language of lawyers and
academics by the Author. To the extent that their versions or observations differ from
the composite, or especially illuminate a point, individual investors' explanations or
interpretations are highlighted as warranted.
The group which agreed to be interviewed anonymously for this project is
comprised of eleven investors and three family members or office staff members of
investors. They have completed transactions in six different states and have each
done between "eight or nine" and "well over a hundred or two" similar transactions.
Some use their own or family funds, whereas others use outside funds entirely. Over
half do this or similar real estate transactions or construction full-time. The longest
tenured investors have been in the business for over thirty years; the shortest real
estate career has been seven years. Three of the investors were related to each other.
Another two were a father and daughter duo. Three of the investors were known to
the Author prior to the project.
Each investor was asked to describe the process of executing the RSLB
transaction from start to finish, explaining the how's and why's of each step of the
transaction. The investors were also asked what they thought were the
good/beneficial and bad/problematic aspects of the transaction and the marketplace
altogether. They were asked to describe their interactions with homeowners, other
investors, and lenders. Finally, they were asked how they felt about recent prosecu-
tions of investors and whether they were optimistic about this product. Each inter-
viewee believed their marketplace is misunderstood by outsiders. This Article seeks
to remedy that problem.
6. While there are several states where this transaction is prevalent, the Author
primarily refers to California law because investors there are on the forefront of this
transaction and because California has a good statute governing these transactions,
which other states could use as a model. See CAL. Cry. CODE § 1695 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). Additionally, it was in California in 2012 that
the first ever white-collar defendant, an RSLB investor, was sentenced to a 33.33
years-to-life sentence under California's Three-Strikes Rule for this transaction. See
Stuart Pfeifer, Housing Scam Brings Up to Life Sentence Under Three-Strikes Law,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), http://articles.latimes.comI2012/aprI28/business/la-fi-
0428-three-strikes-fraud-20 120428.
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judges, and the public, who do not understand the value of the transactions to
the homeowners who use them and to the communities in which the transac-
tions are popular." Instead, the transactions are met with bias and negative
assumptions.f Critics often present the exceptions as if they are the rules and
falsely stereotype the homeowners in these transactions as elderly, frail, and
uneducated.9 As a result, these transactions are increasingly regulated by
criminal law, with convicted investors subject to severe criminal sentences.i''
The effect of this trend will be to eviscerate the RSLB transaction completely.
Much of the limited scholarship on - and condemnation of - this trans-
action comes out of consumer protection jurisprudence, which has been slant-
ed decidedly in favor of the homeowners, and has demonized the investors,
who are generally small, entrepreneurial investors from the same communi-
7. Foreclosure rescue activity encompasses a wide range of activities, which
generally fall into four categories. Some may include provision of negotiation, con-
sultation, or counseling services; others will include actual refinancing of loans with
different terms than the loan being foreclosed; others involve outright sales of proper-
ties. This Article looks at a fourth one, the sale/leaseback/buyback transaction, which
is a type of Pre-Foreclosure Investing (PFI). PFI refers to transactions designed to
rescue a homeowner during the period after the lender publishes its intent to foreclo-
sure, but prior to the completion of the looming foreclosure sale, meaning that RSLB
transactions are executed between the homeowner and the investor. Other types of
rescue transactions happen at other points in the process. Once the official proceed-
ings have begun, the transaction would then involve the bank, and possibly the courts
also.
8. The first line of California's statute governing these transactions, reflects the
built-in biases and assumptions underlying these transactions. CAL. Crv. CODE §
l695(a) ("The Legislature finds and declares that homeowners whose residences are
in foreclosure have been subjected to fraud, deception, and unfair dealing by home
equity purchasers."). Such a declaration reflects the legal and social atmosphere in
which these investors operate.
9. See generally NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURES § 15 (3d ed.
2010) [hereinafter FORECLOSURES]; Cox, supra note 1, at 607,611,618,620 (offering
numerous ways to go after alleged "acquirers" ... and their "confederates," whom he
accuses of "kicking someone who is down"); Nichols, supra note 1, at 280-81 (argu-
ing that foreclosure rescue scams target vulnerable homeowners, yet failing to
acknowledge the benefits the transactions bring to homeowners).
10. See Pfeifer, supra note 6; see Harold Brubaker, 25-Year Prison Term for
Foreclosure-Rescue Scammer, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 3, 2012, http://articles.philly.
com120 l2-10-03/business/342l9ll8_1~rison-term-demarco-rei-massive-mortgage­
fraud; see generally Ellen Podgor, Laws Have Overcriminalized Business Behavior,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2013111/1O/prosecuting-executives-not-companies-for-wall-street-crime/laws-have-
overcriminalized-business-behavior ("Attributing criminality to business-related ac-
tivities is not always so easy. The line between criminal activities and acceptable
business judgments can be fuzzy."); see United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 922
(9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.l, concurring) ("Civil law often covers conduct that falls
in a gray area of arguable legality. But criminal law should clearly separate conduct
that is criminal from conduct that is legal."),
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ties as the homeowners. 11 Another failing of the existing scholarship is that it
neither explains the economics of the transaction and the transaction's role in
the residential real estate market - which is important in assessing the value
of these transactions - nor the step-by-step process of creating and executing
the underlying contracts. Instead, in its efforts to target the investors, con-
sumer protectionism tends to overstate the size of the problem. While there is
opportunity for fraud in any industry, including foreclosure rescue transac-
tions, the transactions themselves are not wholesale fraudulent. Additionally,
none of the consumer protection scholarship has addressed the issue that the
foreclosure rescue investors are as vulnerable to unscrupulous, disgruntled
homeowners as the homeowners are vulnerable to the investors. 12 It also
takes a paternalistic view of the homeowners and strips them of any econom-
ic sophistication. 13 However, consumer protectionists make some very good
suggestions about how to curtail harmful conduct when it does occur in this
marketplace. 14
Currently, the RSLB transaction is being demonized and criminalized,
with escalating numbers and severity of criminal charges and corresponding
sentences. 15 This response is troubling because, although the transaction
11. See Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Equity Stripping: Legal Theories and Strate-
gies to Attack a Growing Problem, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 607 (2006), available at
http://heinonline. org/HOLlLandingPage?handle=heinjournals/'clears9&div= 72&id
=&page= (offering numerous ways to go after alleged "acquirers" and their "confed-
erates," whom the author accuses of "kicking someone who is down"); see also
NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND
MORTGAGE SERVICING 375-418 §§ 15.1-15.5.4.4 (John Rao et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
12. See Cox, supra note 1; FORECLOSURES, supra note 9.
13. See generally Ronald J. Mann, After the Great Recession: Regulating Finan-
cial Services for Low- and Middle-Income Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
729 (2012).
14. The National Consumer Law Center remains at the forefront of combating
impropriety in foreclosure rescue transactions and publishes many manuals and mate-
rials for lawyers to deal with such cases. NAT'L CONSUMER L. CENTER,
https://www.nclc.org/ (last visited May 26, 2014). Additionally, the homeowner
protections of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act have
been strengthened by the homeowner-friendly Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau's (CFPB) Consumer Financial Regulations, which are designed to preempt lend-
er bad behavior. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024, 1026 (2013). However, these regulations
still allow lenders the option to not refinance certain homeowners, which will leave
some homeowners in the position of needing a last resort option, like RSLB, to save
their homes. See id.
15. In one representative case, Browner v. District of Columbia, the defendant
investors were convicted for loansharking, defined as lending money at a rate above
six percent without a license. 549 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1988). Loansharking in the
District of Columbia carried a maximum sentence of "imprisonment for thirty days,
or a $200.00 fine, or both." Id. at 1111. The actual sentence was that they received
"suspended jail sentences and were placed on probation and ordered to make restitu-
tion, pay fines and perform community service." Id. However, recent cases for very
similar behaviors generate charges of fraud, burglary, theft and hosts of other charges.
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allows some opportunities for abuse, it is a good transaction for numerous
reasons. The rubric for a "good" transaction would involve the creation of
options and opportunities for the parties which did not exist before, and
which would not exist without the transaction. In other words, a good trans-
action leaves both parties better off across the averages. This Article will
demonstrate that the RSLB transaction satisfies this rubric. Currently, the
RSLB transaction is the only available solution for a persistent market failure,
it is the market's own endogenous solution, and it makes the parties generally
better off. RSLB also has protections built into the transaction for the parties
and creates clear expectations between the parties. Where the transaction
falls short of the rubric, it could easily be tidied up, and therefore should be
supported. However, the current trend of criminal regulation with unpredict-
able sentences will have the opposite effect and will likely eliminate the
RSLB marketplace - to the detriment of the homeowners."
A second rubric can be introduced to evaluate the best way to regulate a
marketplace. There are four institutions'{ available to regulate a marketplace
and address its problems: a pure market-based regime, preemptive and mar-
ket-facilitating regulation, the civil judiciary empowered with a full slate of
contract doctrines and remedies, and the criminal court with its punitive
sword." One institution is "better" than another if it accomplishes desired
outcomes or minimizes undesirable outcomes better than the alternative insti-
tutions.l" A "good" legal outcome is one which promotes and supports effi-
cient and wealth-maximizing outcomes with the least burden to society as a
whole.i'' and which creates stability and a guide for subsequent parties. A
good outcome also protects the parties from each other equally, concentrates
costs between the parties, and creates incentives for the parties to resolve
disputes within their contracts.
Cori Harvey, "We Buy Houses": Market Heroes or Criminals", 79 Mo. L. REv.,
Appendix (forthcoming 2014).
16. Mann, supra note 13, at 747-48.
17. Neil Komesar's comparative institutional analysis defines "institutions" as
decision-making processes. ("In broad categories, these decision-making processes
include the market, the political process, and the adjudicative process (the courts).
Law in its most common form is the product of a decision-making institution - the
adjudicative process. In tum, economics is the study of the functioning of decision-
making processes most dominantly (but not exclusively) that set of processes roughly
covered by the term 'market. "'), Neil Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Es-
sence of Economics: Reflections on Forty Years in the Wilderness, 2013 WISC. L.
REV. 265 [hereinafter The Logic of the Law]. See also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 9
(1994).
18. The Logic of the Law, supra note 17.
19. See id. (arguing that the relative desirability of any institution over another
must factor in the distribution of costs and benefits across the participants involved in
the institutions).
20. See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 111 (2006).
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For most of the problems in the RSLB marketplace, this Article argues
that the best legal solution is to preempt the problems with market-facilitating
regulation, thereby avoiding criminal or civil litigation altogether. Fortunate-
ly, due to the nature, size, and scope of this marketplace, many of the pro-
posed regulations are minor and could be implemented at the level of the
local jurisdiction or through local licensing requirements, instead of requiring
sweeping regulatory reform." To the extent that problems cannot be
preempted, civil dispositions bring about the next best solutions. Civil dispo-
sitions are better than the current criminal dispositions because, based on the
metrics stated above, criminal dispositions fail at every tum, whereas civil
dispositions satisfy most of the metrics in the regulatory rubric.
Part II will describe the unique market failure that the RSLB transaction
emerged to combat, which is coined here as the "trapped equity paradox," and
explain why that failure exists. Part II will demonstrate the legitimate need
for economic solutions to fill this particular void within the marketplace as
well as explain why small investors are uniquely positioned to fill this void.
Part III will introduce and examine the market's own solution to the
paradox, the RSLB transaction, and will present a previously unexamined
view to demonstrate the logic and structure of the RSLB marketplace. This
Part will also introduce the typical homeowner and investor,22 and the role
that RSLB transactions play in the market. Finally, Part III will show the
actual, yet misunderstood, allocation of economic risks between the contract-
ing parties, including an accounting of where the money goes. The prevailing
wisdom in these cases is that the homeowners do not receive any meaningful
benefit from these transactions. This Part will show that this argument is
unfounded. Part III will also serve as the foundation for a series of articles on
the RSLB transaction.
Part IV will extrapolate the benefits of RSLB transactions to homeown-
ers and also identify where the obstacles in these transactions might emerge,
in order to start a meaningful conversation about how best to avoid the obsta-
cles while preserving the transaction. It is not the goal of this Article to pre-
sent complete solutions to these problems.f Rather, the goal simply is to
21. Severaljurisdictions (suchas California and New York) alreadyhave statuto-
ry frameworks, called Equity Purchase Statutes, in place to govern transactions in-
volving the sale of homes in foreclosure, which would include RSLB transactions.
See CAL. Cry.CODE § 1695 (West,WestlawthroughCh. 16of 2014 Reg. Sess.); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 265-a (McKinney, Westlawthrough L.2014, chapters 1 to 22, 50
to 60); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-105 to -113, 7-301 to -325 (West 2014);
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 407.935-.943; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.134.010-.900.
These frameworks could be modified to effectuate the suggestions made in this Arti-
cle.
22. Author interviewed several of these "typical" investors for this Article. See
supra note 5.
23. For a thorough discussion of these potential problems as well as proposed
solutions, see Harvey, supra note 15 (presenting a catalogue of more efficient, effec-
tive, and simplersolutions than criminal regulation).
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take a good first step in that direction by making a thorough assessment of
where the mines might be buried. As with any systemic problems, some will
be easier to solve than others. Indeed, in the RSLB marketplace, there is a
troubling market failure, a troubling market response to that failure, and a
troubling regulation of that market response - all three of which need to be
fixed?4 However, this Article argues that most of these problems can be
preempted quite easily to protect both homeowners and investors, and pro-
poses that the marketplace for this transaction can be cleaned up without re-
moving the transaction as a solution to very real problems. What follows is
an illumination of why and how the market's own RSLB transactions are
carried OUt.25 The premise is that by understanding the transaction and the
protections that are currently incorporated for homeowners and investors,
academics will be better equipped to address problems arising from the trans-
action. It is easy to see how the protections could be strengthened if they are
failing. It is also easy to see how additional protections could be built into
the transactions to preempt problems and to support this marketplace in ways
that would leave homeowners, investors, and society better off.
II. THE MARKET FAILURE
In America, there are two classes of people: those who have accessible,
value-generating capital and those who have either inaccessible "dead capi-
tal,,26 or no capital at all. "Dead capital," a term used to describe unproduc-
tive capital such as that in the Third World, refers to capital that could gener-
ate value, but fails to do so due to a lack of market and legal processes to
release that value." The Third World, however, does not have a monopoly
on dead capital. In America, something very close to this dead capital exists
where, due to a lack of access to outside funding and credit mechanisms,
some homeowners cannot access their internal capital, which is the equity in
their homes. Home equity is the difference between the market value of a
home and all encumbrances upon it.28 Equity, once extracted as cash, can be
24. Addressing the underlying market failure is outside of the scope of this Arti-
cle. A subsequent article decries the institutional choice to use the criminal law, in-
stead of contract law, to regulate this marketplace. See id.
25. For this reconstruction, Author relied on interviews with investors, court
transcripts - which are the best existing versions of events from the homeowners'
perspective, equity purchase statutes, publications from the National Center for Con-
sumer Law, and investor training materials. See supra note 5.
26. HERNANDO DE SOTO, MYSTERIES OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 15 (2000) (coining the term "dead capi-
tal" and defining it as assets which cannot be used to their fullest).
27.Id. at 36-38 (arguing that what distinguishes the West from the Third World
is that capital in the West can be converted into value; whereas, capital in Third
World countries is dead because the legal and market processes do not exist to liber-
ate that value).
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 443-44 (7th ed. 2000).
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used to meet any cash needs the homeowners might have. These homeown-
ers face the "trapped equity paradox.v"
A. The Trapped Equity Paradox
The trapped equity paradox refers to the simultaneous conditions ofhav-
ing equity in one's home, needing cash, and not being able to access the equi-
ty to convert it to cash. This paradox can cause high equity homeowners to
find themselves defaulting on their short-term debt payments - such as credit
cards and auto loans - sometimes to the point of bankruptcy or vehicle repos-
session. In addition, these homeowners may face foreclosure because they
cannot meet the monthly mortgage payments on the very home in which the
equity is trapped.i"
Although accessible under normal market conditions using ordinary
banking and credit functions, as a result of the trapped equity paradox a
homeowner's equity may remain trapped in the home as something similar to
what scientists call "potential energy.v" The equity cannot be released or put
to work for lack of access to credit. 32 That credit could come in the form of a
home equity loan or a mortgage refinance loan, which would allow a home-
owner to extract that capital and put it to a higher value or higher priority use.
Therefore, the potential energy within a home represents the home's dormant
power to generate value and increased productivity for the homeowner.F
29. Author coins this term here.
30. To some extent, all homeowners have trapped equity, unless they have ac-
cess to one hundred percent loan-to-value financing. The paradox arises when the
homeowner also has a critical cash need that cannot be met. The paradox is like
Samuel Taylor Coleridge's Ancient Mariner: "Water water, everywhere, Nor any
drop to drink." See SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, THE RIME OF THE ANCIENT
MARINER 53 (Thomas Dilworth ed., Dufour Editions 2005) (1798).
31. "Potential" is defined as something that can develop or become actual.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 971 (lIth ed. 2003) [hereinafter
MERRIAM-WEBSTER]. "Energy" is defined as a vigorous exertion of power. See id. at
413. Therefore, potential energy is that which can develop into a vigorous exertion of
power.
32. The lack of access to credit may be due to limited or no income, or a poor
credit score. See Fin. Crimes Intelligence Unit, 2010 Mortgage Fraud Report Year in
Review, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION 6 (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter 2010 Mortgage
Fraud Report], http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-
2010/mortgage-fraud-report-2010 (citing 1st Quarter 2011 Community Outlook Sur-
vey, FED. RES. BANK PHILADELPHIA, http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-
development/community-outlook-surveyI201l/20 llq l.cfm (last visited May 19,
2014)) ("low-income households still struggle to access credit[, and] ... [t]he top
three factors contributing to a lack of access to credit include lack of financial
knowledge, underwriting standards/credit ratings, and lack of cash flow.").
33. See DE SOTO, supra note 26, at 42-50.
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While not dead, trapped equity is sleeping capital and needs to be awakened
so that its potential energy is changed into kinetic energy."
Homeowners who suffer the trapped equity paradox are primarily asset-
rich and cash-poor. Such homeowners own a valuable asset - their homes -
often with significant equity, but few, if any, other liquid assets. Moreover,
they lack access to credit, which is the main unifying characteristic of this
groUp.35 The homeowners' equity exists for one of two reasons: first, they
may be long-time homeowners who purchased homes at lower past prices
with lower mortgages than current market prices; second, the housing market
may be rising quickly, creating large stores of equity in short periods of time,
even for new owners. However, because these homeowners are credit-
starved, they cannot access their own home-bound wealth for other beneficial
uses through normal credit channels. That equity is inaccessible because
when these homeowners cannot show both a means and a willingness to pay
back their loans, either with current cash flow or other liquid assets, they can-
not qualify for financing or refinancing to extract this equity.
B. The Trapped Equity Paradox and Pre-Foreclosure
The trapped equity paradox becomes especially salient when homeown-
ers are in "pre-foreclosure" - having defaulted on their primary loans due to
income stoppages - but have not yet lost their homes to foreclosure. Pre-
foreclosure is the final period of non-payment before a foreclosure sale of the
property and eviction.i'' At this point, lenders in most jurisdictions legally
must notify homeowners that the homeowner is in default on the terms of the
mortgage'" and, subsequently, of the lender's intent to sell the property in a
foreclosure sale38 after a statutorily set period of time?9 If it is not already
too late, homeowners have several options to bring their loans current to
avoid foreclosure, all of them problematic. Homeowners may try to refinance
their loans using their own credit or through the illegal practice of borrowing
the credit of friends or loved ones; they may find a cash windfall to make a
34. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 31, at 687 (defining "kinetic energy" as
energy associated with motion); see also DE SOTO, supra note 26, at 42-50.
35. Lack of credit is the unifying characteristic because, if they had access to
credit, their equity would not be trapped. Instead, they could get a loan to extract that
equity as cash.
36. Prior to official pre-foreclosure, a homeowner is just in arrears.
37. This is often called a Notice of Default, which is sent to the homeowner and
published. See CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURES: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
EQUITY PURCHASES AND THE LAWS GOVERNING DISTRESS SALES 155 (Fred Crane et
al. eds., Zyrus Press 2007).
38. This is often called a Notice of Trustee's Sales, which is published. See infra
note 69 and accompanying text.
39. See FORECLOSURES, supra note 9, app. E at 905-27 (providing a state-by-
state summary of foreclosure laws, including notice requirements).
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lump-sum payment; they may lease the property out if they can get a premi-
um over the mortgage payment; or, they may sell their homes quickly.
Often, these homeowners' friends and families cannot or will not act as
a stand-in to get credit for the homeowners - either because they know it is
illegal or because they cannot afford to do SO.40 Additionally, while a perfect-
ly timed windfall is possible, it is unlikely that these homeowners will sud-
denly find the cash needed to save their homes, which likely equals several
months' worth of past due mortgage payments and late fees.4 1 Leasing the
home to a renter may generate enough income to cover the monthly mortgage
payment.Y However, it is unlikely that it will generate enough to pay the
arrears on the mortgage in the short timeframe provided.f Leasing also re-
quires that homeowners get their credit approved to rent elsewhere, to relo-
cate themselves - at potentially great cost - and to pay monthly rent on their
new homes, which they struggled to do on their previous homes." Therefore,
leasing out the home and trying to relocate may create more problems than it
solves. Further, it would likely be difficult to sell their properties in the short
timeframe provided for in the foreclosure notifications, except to quick-
moving, savvy investors or cash buyers, who would likely have their pick of
properties and would benefit from robust competition for their investment
dollars. Moreover, even if the homeowners could sell their homes under
these conditions, they would likely receive a low price relative to the actual
value of the property." Additionally, some homeowners waste a lot of time
completing the refinance loan application process, only to be disappointed
when rejected in the eleventh hour.46 Finally, many homeowners lose valua-
ble time in denial about exactly where they are in the foreclosure process.
40. See supra notes 5 & 25.
41. See supra notes 5 & 25.
42. See supra notes 5 & 25.
43. See supra notes 5 & 25.
44. See supra notes 5 & 25.
45. However, there is a foreclosure rescue market for the outright sale of high-
equity homes facing foreclosure. This may be a good option for people with homes in
saleable condition, who just want to leave their homes and take some cash with them,
while avoiding the harm to their credit and the humiliation of a foreclosure. This
should be distinguished from sales of no-equity or negative-equity homes during
foreclosure, which are most often seen in market slumps and are more complicated as
they can require negotiations with a third party, the lending bank. No-equity and
negative-equity transactions are not the focus of this Article.
46. Even with new CFPB mandates, banks can and will continue to decline a
certain percentage of modification and refinance requests, leaving those homeowners
in the situation described here - sans options. See supra notes 5 & 25. See also
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB BULLETIN 2012-04 (FAIR LENDING) 1
(2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fI201404_cfpb_bulletin_lending
_discrimination.pdf (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1024-26 (2013); see generally Patricia A.
McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 55 ARIZ. L.
REv. 723 (2013) (describing a myriad of obstacles to successful loan modifications).
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C. The Efficient and Maximizing Voidl7
381
The trapped equity paradox exists due to a void of supply in the rescue
lending market.48 Homeowners facing the trapped equity paradox would
benefit from a rescue loan when facing a foreclosure. There is high demand
amongst these homeowners for rescue loans. However, even where home-
owners would take these loans at high rates, such rescue financing is extreme-
ly difficult to find.49 Lenders, generally large banks, are unwilling to lend to
these homeowners for risk-related reasons. Because they have defaulted on
other commercially available original and backup loans and are already fac-
ing the foreclosure process, these homeowners are high-risk borrowers. And,
because they are high-risk, they cannot obtain new financing through tradi-
tional or sub-prime channels. Traditional commercial lenders may avoid
making such rescue loans because these homeowners have shown a willing-
ness to default on loans, or because their credit-worthiness or incomes have
fallen below what they were at the time of the original loans. Traditional
lenders may also prefer not to serve this market because these homeowners
have too many secondary loans on the properties. Sometimes, the lenders
simply do not want to lend more money on homes that they feel are likely to
end up in their inventories anyway.i" especially if the equity of the homes
47. Many of the propositions stated in this Part are supported by information
from interviews conducted by the Author. See supra note 5.
48. Rescue lending is lending designed to save a drowning homeowner from
foreclosure. See generally FORECLOSURES, supra note 9, § 2 (discussing pre-
foreclosure workout and modification agreements). It may include traditional or non-
bank refinance loans, modifications of existing loans, or newly originated loans. See
id. at §§ 2.3-2.6 (describing workouts and modifications). It may also include various
government programs designed to prevent foreclosure. Id. at § 2.3.3 (describing the
federal, state, and local programs used to help homeowners in financial distress); see
also id. at §§ 2.8-2.12 (describing programs used by the federal government). Rescue
transactions may be offered by traditional banks, investors, friends and family, or
government bodies. See id. at § 2.1.1.
49. 2010 Mortgage Fraud Report, supra note 32, at 6. Providers of services for
the credit-strapped have seen an increase in demand for their services. Id. Lack of
access to credit is the biggest constraint on the expansion of the real estate market. Id.
50. A home can end up in a bank's inventory if the property fails to sell at the
foreclosure sale/auction because there are no suitable outside bidders. BAXTER
DUNAWAY, LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 49:1 (2013). In that case, the proper-
ty is known as "real estate owned" or "bank-owned." Id. At this point, the lender
must try to resell the property and must bear the costs of maintaining the property in
the meantime, including payment of taxes, utilities, and insurance. Chris Palmeri,
The Painful Cost of Foreclosure, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 8, 2008),
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/hotproperty/archivesI2008105/the~ainful_
cos.html (describing how costs to the lender will include maintenance, taxes, vandal-
ism, appraisals, legal fees, broker fees and more).
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would be consumed by the expenses of foreclosure.i" Many banks have a
blanket rule that they do not lend to homeowners already facing foreclosure,
regardless of other variables.52
Lenders are also unwilling to lend to these homeowners for operations
related reasons. Banks may avoid this segment of the borrowing population
because the segment's risk profile requires a large amount of individualized
monitoring; large lenders are not equipped to monitor individual, high-risk
customera" Therefore, this group is operationally inefficient for banks to
work with. Instead, large lenders gravitate to sectors that reward size, vol-
ume, expediency, and market power.i" Rescue transactions, even where there
is trapped equity, require small, nimble, and adept lenders who are on the
ground and capable of managing individual transactions.f Large lenders
would need to commoditize these impossible-to-commoditize transactions in
order to serve this market" Therefore, banks have abandoned this piece of
the borrowing market, creating a void.57 The efficiency of that void is debat-
able because the banks' categorical unwillingness to serve this market exac-
erbates the trapped equity paradox for these homeowners.
51. The costs incurred by the foreclosing bank during the foreclosure process are
charged to the homeowner and deducted from the equity in the home.
FORECLOSURES, supra note 9, § 6.4.4.6 ("The lender has little incentive to minimize
[foreclosure costs] because they can be passed on to the borrower.").
52. See generally Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit: Examining
the Structural Inequities ofSubprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233 (2006) (de-
scribing how borrowers with "blemished" credit are often excluded from the tradi-
tional mortgage market).
53. See Mann, supra note 13, at 735 (describing the credit lending preferences of
large banks).
54. Id. at 748 (arguing that, where it is unprofitable for banks to service certain
households, we should "foster other institutions that might serve them" and that, in-
stead of stomping these other providers out, we should "bring them within the tent of
'favored' financial providers.").
55.Id.
56. See id. at 735.
57. Id. The hole in the market exists because it is inefficient for large banks to
fill it. Currently there is no efficient way to fill that void other than by using small,
informal investors. The market has responded with the RSLB transaction. To fill the
void any other way, including the ways contemplated by the judicial and legislative
responses, requires big, clumsy banks to act small and nimble, or requires small, in-
formal investors to formalize and scale up at great cost. Small investors can offer
individualized solutions that are relationship- and contacts-based. NAT'L CONSUMER
LAW CENTER, INC., WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE WHEN THEY SHOULD MODIFY AND
OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR 12, v-viii (2009), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-servicers-modify.pdf; see Ronald J.
Mann, After the Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services for Low- and Mid-
dle-Income Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 729, 735 (2012) (describing the
dearth of financial services for low-income people and their preferences for local,
non-bank solutions); MICHAEL S. BARR, No SLACK: THE LIVES OF Low-INCOME
AMERICANS 10, 15 (2012).
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Deepening the paradox, this market failure also exists because, when
there are large equity stores in properties, banks have another profit-
maximizing, redistributive motivation not to provide new financing as well.
In essence, the banks may want these homeowners to fail. Banks are able to
recoup their full costs of foreclosure from the equity in the home; therefore,
they have no incentive to keep their costs low when there is a lot of equity in
the foreclosed home, thus redistributing the value of that equity from the
homeowners to the banks themselves.i'' At the point of foreclosure, the bank
has two options: (1) let the property be sold at a courthouse sale59 to a buyer
who will pay the bank at least the amount owed on the underlying mortgage;
or, (2) place its own minimal bid on the property in a courthouse sale and
retain possession of the property and most, if not all, of the trapped equity.60
Unlike homes with little or negative equity, homes with substantial equity
stores can be very profitable for banks to take back in the foreclosure process,
especially in a robust market." Therefore, the bank has no real incentive to
lend to this group of high-equity, high-risk homeowners to help them avoid a
foreclosure. Consequently, homeowners can easily watch their equity disap-
pear as it is eaten up by fees and other liens, generally leaving the homeown-
ers with none of the proceeds, despite the foreclosure sale taking place at a
price above what they owe on the property.
III. THE MARKET'S ORGANIC SOLUTION: THE RSLB
Due to its inherent genius,62 the market has developed its own responses
to the trapped equity/pre-foreclosure market failure. The process of losing
one's home to foreclosure is very messy and strips the homeowner of any
58. See generally Diane E. Thompson, Why Servicers Foreclose When they
Should Modify and Other Puzzles ofServicer Behavior, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CENTER
(Oct. 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-servicers-modify.pdf.
59. A courthouse sale is the standard mechanism for disposing of foreclosed
homes. DUNAWAY, supra note 50, § 16:40. It enables the foreclosing lender to liqui-
date the home, to recoup its cash investment and clear the property from its inventory.
See id. § 16:33. Depending on the jurisdiction, the sale may be conducted on the
courthouse steps or electronically. Id. § 16:40. These sales often fail, causing the
home to revert to a bank's possession.
60. Id. § 16:39.
61. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 893 n.7 (Vicki Been et al eds., 5th
ed., 2010); Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, Lenders' Cost of Foreclosure, L. OFF. DAVID C.
WINTON 5 (May 28, 2008), http://www.dcwintonlaw.com/wp-content/uploadsI2010
106/Lenders-Cost-of-Foreclosure.pdf; Thompson, supra note 58 (arguing that loan
servicers generally do not lose money on a foreclosure, whereas they lose money on
modifications).
62. See DE SOTO, supra note 26, at 50 (crediting Aristotle with discovering that
"2,300 years ago, [that which] you can do with things increases infinitely when you
focus your thinking on their potential").
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control.63 Therefore, for homeowners wishing to save their homes and to
retain some control over the process." a solution of last resort becomes nec-
essary, as the only remaining option is for the homeowners to lose their
homes and, most likely, their equity, thereby having to relocate their fami-
lies.65 Inside this void of financing, there exists a group of small, informal
investors willing to provide solutions of last resort to these otherwise aban-
doned homeowners. Small investors are ideally situated from both a risk-
tolerance and an operational-efficiency standpoint to design a solution to fill
this lending void.
One market solution is the RSLB transaction, which mobilizes dormant
equity." The RSLB is a non-bank financial transaction, which is popular
among credit consumers who, for various reasons, either do not have access
to or do not trust the established banking community." Currently, the market
solution to the supply and demand misalignment in the trapped equity para-
dox exists outside of conventional mortgage finance. Non-bank investors
come into this arena to reconfigure the marketplace, realigning the relation-
63. Part of why the foreclosure process is so disorderly, relative to a negotiated
rescue transaction, is that the homeowner's status in the property is murky during
foreclosure proceedings. Varying across jurisdictions, after the foreclosure proceed-
ings a homeowner may be considered a trespasser, an occupant in adverse possession,
or a lessee, and he likely has no idea how or when the next step in the legal process
will commence.
64. Some homeowners in this position wish to save their homes for economic or
emotional reasons; some homeowners merely wish to forfeit their homes, often for
economic reasons. See supra note 5.
65. There have been a number of responses to the market failure that exists in the
real estate rescue lending market - where there is demand for high interest rate rescue
loans, but no supply. Something keeps the commercial rates from going up to their
legal limits, like credit card rates do. There is a magical point at which traditional
banks just stop lending in both weak markets (perhaps due to equity-risk) and strong
markets (perhaps due to a particular borrower's default-risk or the bank's own profit-
maximizing motives), unless there is some type of government intervention. See
supra note 5.
66. These transactions are often called "equity purchases." See, e.g., CAL. Crv.
CODE § 1695.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). In an equity
purchase transaction, an investor purchases the equity in a homeowner's home direct-
ly from that homeowner during the pre-foreclosure period. See, e.g., id. This is one
way a homeowner is able to access his equity. Essentially, the homeowner gives up
his equity and receives something in exchange. See, e.g., § 1695.3. Payment for that
purchase can be in the form of cash or some other valuable benefit to the homeowner.
That value would be negotiated between the investor and the homeowner. Some-
times, an equity purchase transaction involves a repurchase option as in the RSLB
transactions described in this Article, where the homeowner has the ability to buy the
property back later. For sample statutes, see CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1695-1695.17; N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW §§ 265-266 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 22,
50 to 60).
67. Mann, supra note 13, at 743.
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ships between owners and lenders and extending or avoiding the foreclosure
process by liberating trapped equity.
The RSLB transaction generally involves a homeowner.f a lender, an
investor, and a secondary investor. The RSLB transaction becomes a viable
option when a homeowner faces foreclosure proceedings because he is in
arrears and cannot obtain any more financing to save his or her property due
to income and/or credit restrictions - in other words, he faces the trapped
equity paradox. Practically, the period of pre-foreclosure, which starts when
the lender indicates its intention to foreclose, turns out to be the most efficient
time to initiate this type of transaction. The period of pre-foreclosure begins
after the homeowner has been in arrears for a period of time, and the lender
finally publishes in a local newspaper that it is initiating the legal process that
will culminate in the foreclosure sale of the property at the court on a set date
in the near future" The sale can be averted in the short period between the
filing and the courthouse sale, if the homeowner can get help.
Prior to the public filings against a homeowner, which publicly an-
nounce the lender's intention to foreclose, investors have no way of identify-
ing the homeowner as needing financial assistance without excessive search
costs. 70 Additionally, trapped equity homeowners who are not facing fore-
closure may still have other financial options. On the other side, for home-
owners already in actual foreclosure and being evicted, the process is far
more complicated as it involves undoing a legal process that is already un-
derway and negotiating with a third-party mortgage lender. For this reason,
RSLB and other pre-foreclosure transactions occur just before the original
mortgage lender begins to take back possession of the home, along with a
large chunk - or all - of the equity trapped in the property. Without such
opportunities, a homeowner would definitively lose his home to foreclosure."
68. In California, the homeowner is an "equity seller" which means a "seller of a
residence in foreclosure." CAL. CIV. CODE § l695.l(c).
69. That publication is called a "Notice of Default" in California and other juris-
dictions. See CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURES, supra note 37, at 155.
70. Prior to this publication, homeowners have limited opportunity to find inves-
tors. At that point, homeowners would rely on word of mouth or respond to signs that
say, "We Buy Houses," neither of which is organized or efficient. Therefore,publica-
tion serves as this market's informal matching function.
71. Recently, in response to the latest foreclosure crisis, large lenders have start-
ed trying to provide leaseback solutions similar to those provided by RSLB investors.
However, this mis-response is a part of the problem this Article decries. Fannie Mae
has launched its Deed for Lease program, which allows lenders to become landlords
of individual foreclosed homeowners. See Servicing Guide Announcement SVC-
2012-25, FANNIE MAE (Nov. 28, 2012), https://www/fanniemae.com/content/announ-
cement/svc1225.pdf; Lisa Prevost, The Rental Alternative to Foreclosure, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/20 l2109/30/realestate/mortgages-the-
rental-alternative-to-foreclosure.html?J=O (describing Bank of America's and Citi-
bank's clumsy efforts to become landlords of their foreclosed homeowners). None of
these programs allow the buyback option and each requires the homeowner to be
employed.
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To execute an RSLB transaction, a homeowner contracts with a small,
non-bank investor. Under that arrangement, the homeowner sells the home to
that investor, rents the home back for a negotiated period of time - the
"leaseback period" - at a negotiated rent, and, finally, buys the home back at
a negotiated price on a negotiated date if the homeowner can and wants to.72
This solution averts the foreclosure by liberating the homeowner's trapped
equity.i" However, the RSLB transaction is not without risk for the investor
and the homeowner; many of these transactions result in a homeowner even-
tually losing the home. Nevertheless, the potential is there for a homeowner
to salvage his home, which some homeowners indeed do. 74 And even for
those homeowners who do not salvage their homes, they end up no worse off
for having had the chance.
A. The RSLB Investor'?
Who is the typical investor? The average RSLB investor operates out-
side of the traditional banking structure to provide rescue solutions for trou-
bled homeowners, although he may have several ties to and relationships with
larger banks. Real estate investors operate in specialized niches and under
varying levels of formality, organization, and sophistication. A subset of
investors, called rescue investors, operates in various phases of the pre-
foreclosure and foreclosure process. A subset of rescue investors, RSLB
investors operate in the pre-foreclosure phase specifically.i"
An investor approaches the process of selecting possible investment op-
portunities using five nuanced criteria: niche development, portfolio man-
agement and diversification, availability of investible funds, his own market
predictions, and a rough calculation of the value of the home versus the debt
on the home. Keeping in mind his particular strengths and weaknesses, an
investor seeks to work within particular niches where he has gained compe-
tence and competitive advantages. For example, one investor may specialize
in downtown condos, another in large-lot properties with water rights on the
72. CAL. Cry. CODE § 1695.I(a) defines an investor as an "equity purchaser,"
meaning a "purchaser of any residence in foreclosure [for investmentpurposes]."
73. In its purest form, the sale to a typical investor pays off the foreclosure and
other existing liens at the closing table.
74. See supra note 5.
75. Many of the propositions stated in this Part are supported by information
from interviews conducted by the Author. See supra note 5.
76. Lately, groups other than small private investors have entered the sale-
leaseback marketplace. Specifically, community capital groups and private equity
firms have begun to purchase foreclosed homes from banks in bulk after the foreclo-
sure is complete; these investors then lease the homes back to the homeowners, in-
stead of evicting the homeowners as would normally happen after the bank takes
possession of and resells the homes. In this regard, these large capital groups prevent
the homeowner from having to relocate, but do not save homeowners from the fore-
closure process.
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river, another in small or large suburban homes, and another in inner-city
fixer-uppers. As these types of transactions involve a lot of negotiation with
lenders, other investors, and homeowners, these investors develop and main-
tain long-standing relationships to facilitate the transactions. Understandably,
investors dedicate substantial resources to achieving and maintaining their
competitive advantages in certain niches.I '
From a portfolio and risk management perspective, investors remain
conscious of the scope of their existing investments, cash-flow projections,
and current tolerance for risk. With that in mind, they make predictions both
about the odds of any potential deal becoming productive and about how that
deal would fit in with their current asset allocations. Investors are also acute-
ly aware of their own financial positions. Because many investors engage in
several transactions at once and work with several different funding groups,
they must be aware of and accountable for how they commit their funds and
what level of reserves they maintain to deal with problems as they arise.
RSLB investors share some similarities with traditional mortgage lend-
ers, but are distinct in many other ways. Although these investors are not
traditional mortgage lenders, they may be very organized and may live with
some of the same risks and concerns when approaching potential investments
as other investors of other sizes and sections of the marketplace. However,
because they are not subject to traditional banking constraints, they are able
to set their own standards of credit-worthiness, which benefits lower-credit
homeowners. For example, a traditional lender may only consider the income
of the homeowner in determining credit-worthiness to purchase or refinance a
home; however, an RSLB investor - who is simply forming a lease with the
homeowner - may also consider the income of a long-term, live-in mate, or
77. Some critics of this transaction accuse these investors of seeking out poor,
elderly, or minority homeowners, alleging that investors seek out these groups be-
cause these groups are the most vulnerable targets. See Nichols, supra note 1, at 280.
This may be an erroneous conclusion because it finds a causal relationship where
there may be only a corollary relationship. For example, if an investor sees himself as
a substitute for traditional financing, he will be a good match with those who cannot
get traditional financing, often due to poor credit, and those homeowners will likely
be poor, working class, or temporarily impoverished. If an investor is a minority who
is most familiar with minority neighborhoods, he may use these areas as his niche,
and his targets will be from those areas. Finally, if investors seek to enable home-
owners to mobilize their own equity to fund some of their transactions, they will con-
tract with homeowners who have the most equity to mobilize. Those homeowners
will tend to have owned their homes the longest, which will correlate with their being
older than the average homeowner.
Another common accusation in these cases is that investors exploit religious,
ethnic, or racial affinity. Affinity is shared between two people of a shared heritage,
race, or religion. Again, that an investor and a homeowner share some attribute may
reflect a corollary, not a causal, relationship. People of a particular demographic may
have access to others of the same demographic that they would not have to members
of other demographics. Investors may just have comfort and familiarity in their own
neighborhoods or church communities.
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that of an adult child living at the property with the homeowner, thus creating
more options for a troubled homeowner.
B. The RSLB Transaction'"
The RSLB transaction is a sale of a property to an investor, a leaseback
of the property to the homeowner, a stabilizing resale of the property to a
secondary investor, and a call option-esque right of the homeowner to buy the
property back in the future. 79
The process starts each morning, all across the country, when listing
companies'" aggregate and publish to their paid corporate subscribers - usu-
ally real estate investors and title companies - a list of all recent legal pro-
ceedings initiated by mortgage lenders, tax authorities, and other creditors
against debtors in their area." This publication is the first time investors
learn of distressed homeowners, and it also serves as this market's efficient
search and match function because it allows investors to identify homeowners
easily and inexpensively.f Several investors are likely to contact a home-
owner and offer an RSLB opportunity.f Because of the nature of the busi-
78. Many of the propositions stated in this Part are supported by information
from interviews conducted by the Author. See supra note 5.
79. It is important to distinguish these transactions from those in which a compa-
ny charges homeowners a fee to negotiate a short-sale or modification with the home-
owner's lender. These fee-based services have been addressed by the FTC's 2010
Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule (MARS Rule) and are not the subject of
this Article. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1015.1-.11 (2013). It is important to note, however, that
the FTC has already retreated from its enforcement of key sections of the MARS Rule
(as per its own press release dated 07/1512011), as the FTC realized that, in its haste,
it created clauses which had unintended dampening effects on real estate brokers'
ability to provide genuinely beneficial services to certain homeowners. Press Re-
lease, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Will Not Enforce Provisions of MARS Rule
Against Real Estate Professionals Helping Consumers Obtain Short Sales (July 15,
2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releasesI20 11107/ftc-will-
not-enforce-provisions-mars-rule-against-real-estate.
80. Listing companies are companies that aggregate data from dockets in various
courts and jurisdictions. See CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURES, supra note
37, at 155. A listing company would offer its services in one or more particular juris-
dictions as the process of gathering this data requires that the listing company have an
employee physically standing at either a county courthouse or a city hall type place,
where the data is first released to the public. See id.
81. These proceedings could be Notices of Default, Trustees' Sales of Deeds of
Trust, Foreclosure Sales, Mechanics Liens, State and/or Federal Tax Liens, Sales of
Bank-Owned Real Estate, etc.
82. Prior to publication of this list of homeowners, the only way for the parties to
find each other is either through word of mouth in the community or for homeowner
to respond to a sign on a tree that reads, "We Buy Houses," which is fairly inefficient.
83. The market is competitive and the number of competing offers may feel like
an onslaught to a homeowner. See CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURES, supra
note 37, at 155. The reason for this is that all of the corporate subscribers receive the
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ness, various investors go to the property to meet with the homeowner. The
reason for this initial home visit is several-fold. First, it allows the home-
owner to meet the many investors, which in tum allows the homeowner a
chance to assess the investors' characters to make a better choice of contract-
ing partner. Second, it allows investors a first look at the property in order to
gauge the amount of work and repairs possibly required. Because the proper-
ty being negotiated is a home, it makes sense that investors visit the home and
that early negotiations take place there. Third, it allows the investors to de-
termine the reason for the homeowner's foreclosure, including unforeseen
expenses, drug problems, or other details that only an in-person interview
would reveal. By the end of the day, the homeowner may have several tenta-
tive invitations in hand. 84 The investors leave their initial offers and other
materials with the homeowner for the homeowner's review and family dis-
cussions. The homeowner then considers the various opportunities and the
various terms and, at some point that day or shortly thereafter, selects the
investor with whom he wants to contract. In choosing to work with any par-
ticular investor, the homeowner controls the process and uses his own selec-
tion criteria.f
Once the investor and homeowner have agreed to the transaction and
negotiated the terms - including sale price, leaseback rate and duration, buy-
back price, and often a separate cash payment to the homeowner'" - the par-
ties sign the contract documents. Then the process is suspended for a statuto-
ry waiting period, which corresponds with the homeowner's statutory right of
informationat the same exact time and many will then contact the homeowner. The
day before the publication, none of them knew that the homeowner existed, so the
investors do not trickle in over time. See id.
84. They also often have several competing offers from multiple investors to
choose among for the best offer.
85. One criticism of these terms is that the homeowners do not have a meaning-
ful opportunityto negotiate the terms. However, these are not adhesion contracts; the
investors are often small investors who are closer in size and market power to the
homeowners than either of them is to the large lenders. That it is impossible to nego-
tiate with these small neighborhood investors is unfounded. A second prong of this
argument is that, while the RSLB investors may not be significantly larger in market
power, they are more sophisticated in education and experiential power. Robert J.
Shiller, Historic Turning Points in Real Estate 3, Cowles Foundation Discussion
Paper No. 1610 (2007), http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d16a/d16l0.pdf ("By some
accounts, the greatest challenge for economic forecasters is to predict turning points"
in the real estate and housing markets, which are "populated mainly [by] ordinary folk
who do not react with the speed of professionals"). But see Oren Bar-Gill, The Be-
havioral Economics ofConsumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REv. 749, 756 (2008) (argu-
ing that when products or their usage is not standardized, interpersonal learning is
slower).
86. The amount of this payment is negotiatedbetween the parties. A homeowner
may use this cash payment to get current on other delinquent bills, such as car loans
and other unpaid bills.
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rescission.Y The effect of signing these documents prior to the waiting peri-
od is threefold. First, it ensures that both parties are considering the same
deal terms,88 a written copy of which each party has in hand.89 Second, it
gives the homeowner at least some security that the investor is committed to
helping the homeowner, meaning that the homeowner can stop entertaining
other offers; it also gives the investor similar preliminary assurances that any
resources expended during this period are wisely invested." Finally, it means
that what the parties are considering during the waiting period is whether to
void the contract, not whether to sign the contract. 91
During this waiting period, the homeowner has the time and opportunity
to consider the contract and to have it reviewed by an advisor of his choosing.
The three main terms in an RSLB transaction are the purchase price, the dura-
tion and rate of the lease" and the buyback price and date. It is through the
various, negotiable combinations of these three variables that the investor's
premium is outlined and secured. Homeowners have a chance to negotiate
these terms and to have a range of advisors review the terms, including fami-
ly members, friends, and attomeys.l" During this period, the investor and
87. The length of this statutory cooling-off period varies by state and is specifi-
cally designed for the seller to think about the transaction and to consult a lawyer. In
California, for example, the statutory waiting period for this transaction, called an
"Equity Purchase Agreement," is five days, which is longer than the statutory waiting
period for a refinance transaction, which is three days, and the statutory waiting peri-
od for a standard home purchase mortgage, which is zero days. CAL. Cry. CODE §
1695.4(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 16 of2014 Reg. Sess.).
88.Id. §1695.3.
89.Id. §1695.5(c).
90.Id. § 1695(d)(1).
91. Investors are accused of forcing homeowners to make these decisions and to
negotiate these contracts under very tight time constraints. However, what these
critics fail to recognize are two important factors that are outside of the investors'
control. First, investors do not set the timeline. It is after seeing this list that inves-
tors contact the homeowners. It is not until the time of publication that investors
know of the existence of homeowners; therefore, there is no way for investors to
lengthen that time frame. Those time constraints are statutory and vary by jurisdic-
tion. In California, for example, once a lender publishes his intent, a homeowner has
fifteen days to avoid the foreclosure sale (the lender then can sell the property legally
on the twenty-first day after the notice; however, the lender may take longer than
that.).
92. The California statute states that the terms of the rental agreement must be
included in the original agreement, which the homeowner must have prior to the wait-
ing and attorney review period. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1695.3(f).
93. Some scholars and critics argue that those opportunities are irrelevant be-
cause certain homeowners, in practice, do not have the means to get legal counsel.
That a homeowner may not or cannot take advantage of those opportunities reflects a
larger societal problem and is not unique to RSLB transactions. That problem exists
even as these homeowners both acquire and then lose their homes to foreclosure, as
opposed to being a result of the actions of the RSLB investor. Perhaps Legal Aid
could dedicate its resources to providing contract review sessions to these homeown-
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homeowner cannot have any contact with one another, exchange funds, sign
or execute any further documents, or escrow any funds.I" The investor will
use this period to do his due diligence and conduct title research on the prop-
erty. After the waiting period, if both parties are still committed to the con-
tract, they will move forward. At this point, the parties sign any remaining
contracts, disclosure statements, and the residential lease," often at an escrow
company or lawyer's office.
The investor's first step after the waiting period is to purchase the home
from the homeowner in order to stop the foreclosure procedure, often within
the lender's statutory timeframe of mere days. At the closing, title transfers
to the investor and the homeowner's underlying debts are paid off, including
the mortgage and other liens attached to the property." To provide the quick
capital needed to buy the property and avert foreclosure, the investor has two
options: he can obtain high-rate, short-term financing - called hard-money"
financing - by tapping into his established hard-money lending relationships,
or he can use his own pool of funds. The cost to the investor is either the
hard money rate, often in the fourteen to eighteen percent range." or his own
cost of capital plus the other opportunity costs ofusing his private funds.
Once the investor has bought the home and the foreclosure has been
stopped, the leaseback period begins. After the homeowner has settled into
his lease, the investor resells the property to a secondary investor." The sec-
ers during the statutory attorney review period before the sale, instead of dedicating
its resources to suing the RSLB investors after the fact.
94. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1695.6(a)-(b)(4).
95. The rent would likely be set at the amount the homeowner agrees that he can
pay for the duration of the leaseback period. The homeowner will usually set this rent
at a number that is below his current monthly payment, which he clearly cannot meet
as he is in foreclosure already. If this negotiated rent is below the investor's holding
costs, it will be subsidized by some of the mobilized equity. A more detailed discus-
sion of the rent-setting process follows in a later section. If any material terms are
changed, the statutory waiting period would be reinitiated.
96. Attached liens may include tax or other municipal liens, homeowners associ-
ation dues, mechanic's liens, etc. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 2924(c). Often home-
owners negotiate the payment of other debt, such as car loans, into the transaction
with the investor.
97. A "hard money loan" is a short-term, high rate loan, usually provided by a
non-banking institution or private investor. Mortgages: Hard Money, 40-MAR REAL
EST. L. REp. 6, 6 (2011). These loans are not based on the borrower's credit-
worthiness. Id. Instead, they are based on the value of the home. Id. at 7. Investors
use hard money loans as quick bridge financing that allows them to complete some
short goal, such as a construction or rehab project, or a refinance application. Id. Due
to the high-rate on the loan, hard money is expected to be short-term. Id. at 6.
98. See supra note 5.
99. Pursuant to California statute, a homeowner with any repurchase rights to the
property must approve the transfer of the property from the investor to the secondary
investor in writing. CAL. Crv. CODE §1695.6(e); see also Segura v. McBride, 5 Cal.
App. 4th 1028, 1036-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). Usually, this permission will be a part
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ondary investor is a person or entity with access to more traditional sources of
funding at widely available commercial or investment rates. 100 This resale
does not affect the homeowner's right to buy the property back.i'" During
the leaseback period, the investor may also act as the landlord, incurring the
costs of property maintenance and renovation, taxes, and insurance. Alt-
hough he now is the owner of the property, the secondary investor plays only
a minor role in the property maintenance functions. 102
As the end of the leaseback period approaches, the homeowner has sev-
eral options. First, if he wishes to exercise his call option, he must obtain
new financing to repurchase the home from the secondary investor. This
buyback right may also be assignable depending on the negotiated terms and
the jurisdiction. 103 Second, the homeowner can negotiate an extension of the
buyback date, temporarily maintaining his buyback rights and giving himself
more time. Third, the homeowner can decide under less frenzied and less
stressful circumstances that he wishes to relinquish his buyback rights, let his
repurchase option lapse, and cease to be a homeowner. In this case, he must
either move out of the property or renegotiate to remain in the home as a
renter under a leasehold estate, without any other interest in the home.
Clearly, both parties benefit from this transaction, and both are subject
to significant risks. Neither party can predict how the overall housing market
will perform during the leaseback period - a variable that greatly affects the
relative value of the parties' interests and allocation of their risks - or wheth-
er the homeowner will buy the property back. l 04 In effect, what the home-
owner negotiated for and bought was three-fold. First, he bought some time,
which enables him to get his finances back on track and gives him room to
breathe so he can consider his options carefully. Second, he bought some
of the original contracts. A better idea would be to require that the call option be
recordedat the county offices.
100. Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Can New Americans Achieve the American
Dream? Promoting Homeownership in Immigrant Communities, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 169, 216 (2004). A secondary investor would be someone with investable
capital. Id. at 216 nAI. It could be a small investment group, a lawyer, doctor, or
businessperson looking for rental income, mortgage interest deductions, and capital
gains. They would be looking for a two to four year opportunity, which is a perfect
time-horizon for RSLB. See infra Part III.D.
101. The call option should be properly recorded to encumber the title, at which
point, the burden of the option runs with the land to any subsequentbuyers.
102. Whetherthe secondaryinvestor is considered a "passive" real estate investor,
for tax purposes, is outside of the scope of this Article and would vary by transaction
and by investor.
103. T.P. Galanis, The Future ofFuture Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 513,
516-20 (2003). Although options historically have been inalienable, the majority of
jurisdictionsnow permit alienation.
104. "By some accounts, the greatest challenge for economic forecasters is to
predict turning points [in the real estate market ... and] the housing market is popu-
lated mainly by ordinary people who do not react with the speed of [economic] pro-
fessionals." Shiller,supra note 85.
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reprieve from the carrying costs of the property and achieved a potentially
below-market rental rate during the leaseback period. Finally, he bought a
call option105 on his own property; at the time of the buyback, the homeowner
can either execute or not execute that call.
C. Why the Sale/Leaseback?
One of the benefits of real property ownership is that it serves several
market functions for a homeowner. At various times it serves as a store of
capital, as a reliable shelter, and as a potential source of rental income.i'"
However, the availability of this bundle of benefits is dependent upon dynam-
ic factors. When a homeowner's circumstances change so that the home is no
longer able to provide those benefits, owning the home in fee simple becomes
less valuable. In that case, a sale/leaseback can provide a superior bundle of
benefits for the homeowner.i'" A sale/leaseback allows him to sell the prop-
erty to an investor and lease the home back from the investor for a set period
at a set rate. A homeowner would do a sale/leaseback when he would benefit
both from liberating the stored value in a property by not owning it and from
105. Simply, a call option allows the buyer of the call to purchase something at a
certain date in the future at a certain price, called the strike price. Gregory G.
Gosford, A Primer on Real Estate Options, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 129, 190
(2000). In this instance, the homeowner buys the right to purchase the property back
from the investor at a set point in the future at a set price. Id. Some sources define a
call as "the right to make someone sell." Id.
106. See DESOTO, supra note 26, at 7.
107. But see CAL. Cry. CODE § 1695.12 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 16 of 2014
Reg. Sess.) (creating the presumption of a mortgage, when a homeowner retains both
the leaseback and the buyback after the sale). Traditionally, cases arising from these
transactions have hinged on whether courts found the transaction to fit the characteri-
zation of a mortgage or not. The California statute creates this as a burden-shifting
presumption. Id. If the courts find a mortgage loan instead of a lease, the investor
and secondary investor may not be able to claim economic and tax benefits from the
transaction.
Jurisdictions are split on this question. While some jurisdictions, like Cali-
fornia, create a presumption of a mortgage; other jurisdictions may find an "equitable
mortgage" where they find that the intention of the parties was to create a secured
loan, not to make a sale. See Lawrence R. Ahem, III, Types ofReal Estate Security
Devices: The Equitable Mortgage, in 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 8:5
(2014). Author disagrees with jurisdictions that characterize such transactions as
mortgages, purporting to realign the contract with the "intent of the parties," because
that presumption starts with the paternalistic assumption that the homeowners could
neither have intended to sell nor understood that they were selling their homes under
the circumstances in these transactions. However, this Article presents that, not only
do these homeowners intend to execute these transactions, but that they are able to
discern the myriad benefits they get from these transactions.
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the continued use of the property.i'" the two most important factors to an
owner facing foreclosure who wants to remain in his homestead.
Operationally, by changing his status from owner in fee simple to lease-
holder, the homeowner has created a new arrangement that has other benefits
for him. First, the sale was the only way to mobilize the homeowner's
trapped equity to meet his current expenses. By mobilizing this store of equi-
ty, the homeowner is, in effect, purchasing a second chance at the American
Dream. The sale to the investor pays off the underlying mortgage, thus avert-
ing the foreclosure. With that, the homeowner is spared the humiliation of
eviction and of losing his home to foreclosure, gets his name out of the news-
papers and off of the negative public records, and avoids bankruptcy. It al-
lows the homeowner to stay in his home, keeping his kids in their schools and
allowing the homeowner to remain a part of his community. By averting the
foreclosure, the sale/leaseback saves what remains of the homeowner's credit
and gives him a much-needed mental and emotional reprieve. The sale may
involve a cash payment to the homeowner as well. 109
Another benefit of the sale/leaseback is tax-related. Because he no
longer owns the property, the homeowner becomes free from the property tax
burden associated with homeownership. What the homeowner gives up in
exchange - the mortgage interest deduction - may have been especially small
for the homeowner, if he owned the home for a long time and carries a small,
largely amortized mortgage. Both the mortgage interest and property tax
deductions would also be of no value if the homeowner has limited income
to offset.
The sale/leaseback reduces several other costs for the homeowner as
well. With its built-in search and matching function, the RSLB transaction
saves the homeowner the cost of finding a fast-moving buyer. In addition to
the tax and interest carrying costs, the RSLB transaction shifts other carrying
costs from the homeowner to the investor.':" For example, as the landlord,
the investor is now responsible for insurance, III maintenance and repairs, and
108. Kyle Wells & Ryan Whitby, Evidence of Motives and Market Reactions to
Sale and Leasebacks, 22 J. ApPLIED FIN. 1, 1 (2012).
109. Homeowners usually negotiate with investors to extract cash from the origi-
nal sale to pay other debts owed by the homeowners. This cash would be the differ-
ence between the price paid by the investor in the transaction, and the total amount
that the investor agrees to pay towards liens on the property and other homeowner
debts. Such cash would be used for credit card, auto loan payments, or anythingelse
the homeowner needed. Author confirmed the cash payments that investors call
"usual" through transcripts and court opinions. In certain cases, a homeowner may
extract this cash and put it towards savings or use it to purchase another property. If
this homeowner anticipates not being able to repurchase the home,he wouldview this
as his last opportunity to extractequitybefore the home gets lost.
110. Stephen L. Hodge, Note, Sale-Leasebacks: A Search for Economic Sub-
stance, 61 IND. L.J. 721, 724 (1986). But see supra note 107.
111. Hodge, supra note 110, at 723. Homeowner may still choose to carry his
own renter's insurance policy.
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certain utilities, depending on the jurisdiction.U'' Additionally, the
sale/leaseback exposes the investor and secondary investor to the homeown-
er's moral hazard risk as he has no incentive to make any improvements or to
exercise extra care in the home during the leaseback period. I 13 Instead, the
homeowner would hold off on his efforts until he knew whether he would be
willing and able to buy the property back. 114
A sale/leaseback also provides an opportunity for a homeowner to hedge
himself against real estate price risk. 115 Of the various ways he could save his
home, a sale with a repurchase option is the best way for a homeowner to
limit his downside. If a homeowner were to have successfully borrowed the
money to avoid the foreclosure, or been able to refinance, he would still have
borne the risk of carrying and having to service that debt during a subsequent
market downturn.t'" The RSLB transaction gives him the ability to pass off
that risk to the two investors after having his bills and debts paid off by his
bili d . 117mo uize equity.
As indicated above, the sale/leaseback transaction provides some very
real economic and financial benefits for rational homeowners facing foreclo-
sure with trapped equity. It also serves certain emotional and mental needs of
homeowners.r'f One of the ways that this transaction is possible is by a cost-
112. Id. Jurisdictions vary regarding which utilities must be provided by land-
lords. See, e.g., 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 410.180-410.200 (2013) (requiring landlords
to provide water generally, hot water, and heat, unless the lease states otherwise).
Some require landlords to provide heat and water; others do not. See, e.g., id.
113. Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Moral Hazard in Home Equity Conver-
sion, NAT'I. BUREAU ECON. RES. 1 (May 1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6552.
114. See id. In fact, homeowners who anticipate a market decline or know of
some hidden defect in their homes have the greatest incentive to enter into RSLB
transactions as it may be their last chance to pull any capital out before the market
declines, before someone discovers the home's defect, or before they lose the house
to foreclosure. See Hodge, supra note 110, at 723. Moral Hazard risk is reduced if
the homeowner wants and believes himself able to buy the property back. See Shiller
& Weiss, supra note 113. Even in that case, however, he still has incentive to push
those costs onto the investor. See id.
115. See Shiller & Weiss, supra note 113, at 9-11.
116. See Hodge, supra note 110, at 723, 726-28.
117. See Nanch E. Shurtz, A Decision Model for Lease Parties in Sale-Leasebacks
ofReal Estate, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 385,388-89 (1982).
118. Consumer protectionist paternalism fails to appreciate these benefits for
homeowners and fails to acknowledge that homeowners are capable of identifying
these benefits for themselves. For example, one way investors are accused of stealing
money from homeowners is through contract documents which are too complicated
for homeowners to understand, even if read, and which lead to consent which may not
be valid. This argument has three prongs. See SINGER, supra note 61, at 811-12.
One prong of the argument is that it cannot be assumed that the homeowner would
read the contract. See id. at 811. Much attention has been paid to the ever-decreasing
duty to read. Charles L. Knapp, Is There a 'Duty to Read'", Soc. SCI.RES.NETWORK
(2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23 30632.
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lowering sale of the property to a secondary investor, who has different in-
vestment parameters than those of the primary investor.
D. Why the Sale to the Secondary Investorr"
The role of the secondary investor is both important and misunderstood.
The secondary investor is an investor who is able to provide cash and credit
to the deal in exchange for capital gains, income, and tax advanrages.l'" It is
common for the secondary investor to work in a field other than real estate or
construction. Instead, he is likely a high net worth professional in an unrelat-
ed field who sees real estate as a portfolio opportunity.V!
The second prong of this argument is that, even if homeowners read the con-
tract, they cannot be expected to understand the nature of their commitments or the
likelihood of being able to buy back their homes because they cannot understand the
contract and, therefore, the transaction. See SINGER, supra note 61, at 811-12. The
argument fails to appreciate that these documents are no more complicated than the
original mortgage and subsequent refinance documents on the property as well as the
important role of community knowledge and collective wisdom within communities
where these transactions, and similar activities, are prevalent. It is most likely the case
that these transactions are well-known and well-discussed in these communities.
The third precarious prong in this argument says that, after the homeowners'
failure to read, and their failure to understand, the homeowners' consent can be nei-
ther knowing nor voluntary. See SINGER, supra note 61, at 812. Going a step fur-
ther, some proponents of this argument argue that, where the harm is this great, mean-
ing the risk of losing one's home is high, any consent given could not have been
meaningful consent because no homeowner in his or her right and understanding
mind would have consented to such a possible outcome. See id. The extension of this
argument is that, if losing one's home were foreseeable and discernible, no home-
owner would have agreed to it. See id. at 808. This conclusion equates consent with
confusion. The "couldn't consent" argument says that, because the homeowner could
not understand the contract, he could not have consented. See id. at 811. The
"wouldn't consent" says that, given the possible negative outcome, the homeowner
would not have consented.
119. Many of the propositions stated in this Part are supported by information
from interviews conducted by the Author. See supra note 5.
120. See Wells & Whitby, supra note 108, at 56-69; Vivian Marino, Reaping the
Tax Benefits from Rental Properties, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.
com12007/02/04/realestate/commercial/04sqft.html?pagewanted=all; Douglas Hsiao,
Tax Benefits of Owning Rental Properties, WASH. POST: WHERE WE LIVE (Sept. 4,
2012, 5:30 A.M.), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/where-we-live/post/tax-
benefits-of-owning-rental-propertiesI20 12109102/90acdff2-f53a-ll e l-aab7-
fl99a16396cCblog.html. But see supra note 107.
121. It may be easy to confuse secondary investors with "straw buyers." A straw
buyer is a buyer who purchases something for someone else because that person can-
not qualify to buy the thing for himself. United States v. Parish, 565 F.3d 528, 530
(8th Cir. 2009). Straw buying is common in real estate when a person cannot afford
to buy a home and a straw buyer buys it for the person, using the straw buyer's own
credit, as when a parent buys a home for a child. Brad R. Jacobsen & Michael Barn-
2014] WE BUYHOUSES 397
The sale to the secondary investor serves four key market benefits.
First, the secondary investor is able to obtain financing at a rate that the
homeowner could not possibly get on his own, lowering the cost of the deal
to everyone involved. Lowering the cost of owning the property can pass
through to the homeowner, allowing him to pay a rent that is usually negoti-
ated to be lower than the monthly amount the homeowner was paying previ-
ously to service his various debts on the property. In the lease negotiation,
the homeowner is asked what he can afford to pay for rent. That number is
necessarily lower than the homeowner's current monthly payments, which he
clearly is unable to pay as evidenced by the looming foreclosure.V" Addi-
tionally, the rent negotiated is often below the market rent in the area due to
the secondary investor's access to market-rate financing and his willingness
to delay his gains until he resells the home, either back to the homeowner on
the buyback date or on the open market thereafter. This stabilizing, cost-
lowering transaction also creates an opportunity for the homeowner to estab-
lish a payment history with the investor or the secondary investor as creditor.
That improved credit history increases the chances that the homeowner will
later be able to obtain financing in his own name. If the homeowner cannot
afford to pay a market rent or even cover the secondary investor's costs, the
investor may subsidize the homeowner's monthly payments using some of
the newly mobilized equity.123 The agreed upon rent is a part of the package
that the investor offers to the secondary investor before the secondary inves-
tor agrees to the transaction.P" The two investors do all of this in exchange
for a risk- and cost-related premium sell-back price later.
hill, Drawing the Short Straw-Mortgage Fraud and Straw Buyers, 21 UTAH B. J. 9, 9-
10 (2008). Straw buying is not illegal unless it involves fraud of some sort. A fraud-
ulent straw purchase might be one in which the straw buyer represents to the lender
that he or she would be the owner-occupant, knowing that to be false. In the RSLB
scenario, the secondary investor is not a straw buyer. The secondary investor does
not obtain financing as if for himself. In this scenario, the secondary investor does
not deceive the homeowner or the bank that gives the secondary investor the mort-
gage. All parties are aware that the secondary investor is buying the property for
investment purposes.
122. However, sometimes, the homeowner is able to make the current payment, or
even a higher one, but cannot afford to catch up on the lump sum arrearages fast
enough to stop the foreclosure.
123. In extreme situations, a homeowner may not be able to pay anything for the
duration of the leaseback. In this instance, the entire rent would come out of the mo-
bilized equity, resembling a reverse mortgage. See Reverse Mortgage Products:
Guidance for Managing Compliance and Reputation Risks, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,652,
66,656 (Dec. 16, 2009) (defining reverse mortgages as "non-recourse, home-secured
loans that provide one or more cash advances to borrowers and require no repayments
until a future time").
124. As with any investment, the secondary investor would choose to make the
investment based on the bundle of benefits he would receive, such as monthly rent,
duration of the investment, upfront cash required, risk-reward matrix, etc. The inves-
tor would market the transaction to the secondary investor either after negotiating
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The second market benefit is that the secondary investor frees up the re-
sources that the investor has tied up in the transaction. Due to the nature of
this investment type, the secondary investor necessarily has a time horizon of
at least two to four years. The time of the leaseback must be longer than the
statutory redemption period in the jurisdiction. 125 That investment horizon is
longer than the investor's desired timeframe because the investor may be
executing several simultaneous deals, working with several secondary inves-
tors, and dealing with greater demands on his capital. The secondary investor
frees up the investor's capital - or relieves the investor of the high-rate hard
money obligation - to seek more deals or to make repairs, carry out property
maintenance, and pay taxes and insurance on the property. 126 If it were main-
tained for the duration of the leaseback period, the high-rate, hard money loan
that the investor got from his short-term lenders would make the deal prohibi-
tively expensive for the homeowner, whose rent payment would be set to
cover those expenses. Although the property remains with the secondary
investor through the term of the leaseback period, the secondary investor
would have limited contact with the homeowner and would leave the landlord
function to the investor.
Third, the sale to the secondary investor serves his financial goals as
well. The secondary investor uses this type of investment to diversify his
portfolio of investments. In that regard, this transaction is an alternative to
the stock market or other entrepreneurial opportunities that the secondary
investor could pursue. The rental payments would be substitutes for equity
dividend payments that he might achieve elsewhere; any increases in market
value would be treated as capital gains.
Finally, from a market efficiency perspective, this sale shifts a previous-
ly underutilized tax advantage from the homeowner, who could not fully ben-
efit from it, to the secondary investor, who could better utilize the tax bene-
with the homeowner, or the investor might involve the secondary investor during the
negotiation phase of the transaction. It is likely that the relationship between the
investor and secondary investor exists prior to the negotiations with the homeowner
because the transactions must be executed in a short timeframe and because a suc-
cessful investor would maintain relationships with several potential secondary inves-
tors to complete deals as they arise.
125. In most jurisdictions, there is a statutory redemption period during which the
homeowner could change his mind and buy back his home after a foreclosure or fore-
closure-related sale, which is an RSLB transaction. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE §
1695.12 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). In California, for ex-
ample, this is two years. Id. § 1695.14. It would be imprudent to structure this deal
so that a homeowner must leave before his statutory right of redemption has expired
because the homeowner could come back at any point during that period and say he
wants the house back, in which case, the investors would be prohibited from reselling
the home and might have to vacate another tenant. Even if the homeowner is evicted
during the leaseback period, his statutory right of redemption remains unaffected.
126. See generally Marvin Milich, The Real Estate Sale-Leaseback Transaction:
A View Toward the 90s, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 66, 67-68 (1992).
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fit.127 This benefit comes in the form of deductions for mortgage interest and
expenses, property taxes, and depreciation.l" Prior to this transaction, these
deductions most likely went unclaimed because the homeowner likely did not
have significant income to offset. After the second sale, the secondary inves-
tor can use those benefits more efficiently by offsetting his higher income. 129
E. Why the Buyback Option?
With the buyback option, the homeowner retains his ability to regain the
American Dream of homeownership. Although the homeowner could retain
a statutory right of redemption130 if he lost his home in foreclosure and his
127. See Wells & Whitby, supra note 108, at 58 (arguing that, under the US tax
code, a lessee with a lower marginal tax rate can shift his tax allowances to a higher
rate lessor through a sale and leaseback of an asset and that a property owner could
negotiate a lower lease rate in exchange for the tax deductions).
128. Id. at 58, 66.
129. Id. at 58 (arguing that a homeowner could negotiate a lower lease rate in
exchange for the tax deductions to the secondary investor).
130. A statutory right of redemption exists only in certain jurisdictions and allows
a homeowner who has been foreclosed upon to repurchase his home for a set period
after the foreclosure sale, usually one year, for the sale price, plus foreclosure expens-
es, which can be excessive and may consume all of the equity in the property. Twen-
ty-two states have statutes providing an absolute right of redemption. ALA. CODE § 6-
5-248 (LexisNexis 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.0315 (West 2014); 735 ILL. COMPo
STAT. ANN. 5/15-1603 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-10-11 (West 2014);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (West 2014); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 426.220 (West
2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6313 (West 2014); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §
600.3140 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.23 (West 2014); Mo. REV. STAT. §
443.410 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-4 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-
16 (West 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-21.27 (West 2014) (providing the short-
est redemption period at ten days); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-19-18 (West 2013);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5721.38 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 43 (West
2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-23-2 to -3 (West 2013) (providing the longest
redemption period at three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-47-23 (2013); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 66-8-101 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4941, 4949 (West
2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.13 (West 2013); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-18-103 (West
2013). Nine states have laws providing a hybrid/conditional statutory right of re-
demption. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 12-1281 (LexisNexis 2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
34.20.090 (West 2014); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1931 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 49-20 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 654.20 (West 2014); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 18 (West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-228 (West 2013);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-906 (West 2013); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 61.24.050
(West 2014). The remaining states - Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virgin-
ia, and the District of Columbia - do not provide a statutory right of redemption. See
The Right of Redemption, ALLLAW.COM, http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/
foreclosure/right-of-redemption.html (last visited Apr. 23,2014).
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jurisdiction recognized that right, the sale/leaseback and repurchase option
often can be the superior choice for the homeowner. When the homeowner
sells the home to the investor, the homeowner retains the right to buy the
property back at a set date in the future at a set and definitive price, without
having to relocate. The role of the option contract is to provide certainty for
the homeowner regarding when and at what price he can regain his home;
alternatively, the foreclosure process keeps these two variables unknown and
unknowable to the homeowner. In the foreclosure process, he has no control
over when and at what price the lender will initiate the initial foreclosure sale,
nor at what price the foreclosure buyer, often his original lender, will decide
to resell the property, nor control over when the lender will evict him.
The future repurchase price will be higher than the current value of the
home. 13 1 When the homeowner agrees to buy the property back in the future,
that is evidence of his belief that the property value will rise in the interim. In
fact, the buyback price is a direct quantification of the homeowner's and the
investor's market expectations for the leaseback period. For example, if the
home is worth ten dollars today, and the four-year repurchase price is twelve
dollars, then the homeowner expects the value of the home to increase to
more than twelve dollars over the next four years. If they are both right that
the market is rising, each should be happy to execute the buyback transaction
on or near the buyback date. In that case, the homeowner is reinstated back
into his home and has captured any equity over the twelve dollar repurchase
price. The investor and the secondary investor are able to liquidate the in-
vestment, having captured their share of the equity up to the twelve dollar
repurchase price.
If, however, both parties are wrong, the value of the home will either
remain flat or decline. If there is the expectation that the market is going to
decline, the investors have no identifiable reason to enter into this transaction
in the first place. Such examples are few and far between, and the failure to
recognize the early whispers of a market downturn is the most costly mistake
This right of redemption is disfavored because it binds title for the entire
period and discourages the new owner from making any improvements to the land or
property for the duration of the right as the new owner does not know when or if he
will ever actually own the property. See, e.g., United States v. Stadium Apartments,
Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1970). Some jurisdictions also prohibit the buyer
from moving in during the redemption period. This should not be confused with an
equitable right of redemption, which is a homeowner's right to make the lump sum
payment needed to buy himself out of foreclosure by bringing his loan current at any
point leading up to the actual foreclosure sale.
131. However, sometimes, the future buyback price can be equal to or lower than
the current value of the home or even identical to the amount owed on the foreclosure,
depending on the negotiations of the homeowner. In these cases, what the investor
gets is access to the equity for the time of the leaseback period at least, which he
might agree to, if he believed he could make money with that money during the
leaseback.
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these investors can make. 132 However, an added benefit to the homeowner is
that he benefits from doing the transaction whether he anticipates the market
rising or falling. Even if anticipating a market decline, the homeowner still
has an incentive to do the deal instead of facing foreclosure.
The homeowner's incentive comes from his ability to mobilize the equi-
ty in the home - often collecting at least some cash payment - and to live
there for two to four years, even ifhe plans to leave shortly thereafter. There-
fore, regardless of the homeowner's market expectations, he has the incentive
to execute this transaction. The homeowner knows that, even if the market
declines, he is still no worse off than he would have been had he lost the
home to foreclosure. In the event of a market downturn, the homeowner ei-
ther will not be able to get financing for the buyback due to a failing appraisal
value or simply will not want to rebuy a home that is worth less than he
agreed to pay for it.
Those are the same options available to the homeowner if he considered
buying his home back through the statutory right of redemption, if it were
available to him, all the while trying to guess what his buyback cost would
be. If the homeowner is able to extract one dollar from this deal that would
have been lost to foreclosure, he is better off having done the transaction than
not having done it.133 If, in fact, the market does decline during the leaseback
period, a rational homeowner can walk away from the deal finding himself
no worse off than had he never met the investor; in that case, he would have
lost the property two to four years earlier in the foreclosure process, but
would not have accessed any of his equity. The secondary investor, however,
would be burdened with having to sell a leveraged property at a loss during a
market correction.
There are many ways to frame this transaction. It could be analyzed us-
ing option theory; in that case, what the homeowner is buying with some of
his newly mobilized equity is a call option. 134 The repurchase price would be
the strike price.r" If the home's value in the future is greater than the buy-
back price, then that call is "in-the-money" and the homeowner will exercise
it.136 If, however, the value in the future is below the strike price, the option
132. See discussion supra note 104.
133. In addition to the one dollar, the homeowner would receive the value of
avoiding the foreclosure and possible bankruptcy, which would benefit his credit-
rating. Les Christie, Bankruptcy Can Save Your House from Foreclosure, CNN
MONEY (July 24, 2010, 10:58 P.M.), http://money.cnn.comI20101071211real_estate/
bankruptcy_andjoreclosure/.
134. A call option, gives the option holder the right to buy an asset at a certain
price and at a specified point in the future. See supra note 105.
135. The strikeprice is the price at which an option can be exercised. See supra
note 105. Here,it wouldbe the repurchase price of the property.
136. A call option is "in-the-money" when the value of the asset rises above the
strike/buyback price of the option. If the call holder exercises an in-the-money op-
tion, he purchases the asset at the pre-negotiated price. Because that price is below
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is out of the money and the homeowner should let it lapse. The RSLB can be
framed as a property conveyance, from which the homeowner retains a lease-
hold estate and an executory interest,137 which is his repurchase option. The
buyback can be framed as merely a contractual relationship.v" Effectively,
they all have the same impact for purposes of this Article, and each creates
something of value in the homeowner. Clearly, the homeowner's right to buy
the property back should be recorded and may be assignable.
Recording the transaction and the repurchase option encumbers the title
and, in that way, serves as an official form of retained property right for the
homeowner and creates a burden that runs with the land. As a property right,
that option to repurchase may be assignable to another possible buyer,139 es-
pecially if it has intrinsic value. A call option has intrinsic value when the
market value at the time of exercise is higher than the call's strike price; this
is considered an "in-the-money" option. In that case, the moment the home-
owner exercises his call option he captures the equity created between the
buyback price and the then-prevailing market price. Therefore, the cash val-
ue of that call is in that automatic equity. The sale or assignment of the right
the current market price, he automatically earns the difference between the price he
agreed to pay and the current market price.
137. The exact classification of the right the homeowner has is debated in proper-
ty circles. Some would argue that the homeowner sold the entire estate, and then
simultaneously bought a future executory interest for himself; see JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, PROPERTY § 7.3, 308 (3d Ed., 2010) (explaining that, though executory inter-
ests are usually held by third parties, options are treated as executory interests, even if
held by the grantor for other reasons). "Generally, executory interests vest an estate
in the holder of the interest upon the happening of a condition or event ... an execu-
tory interest cuts short the present estate [of the secondary investor]." Cent. Del.
Cnty. Auth. v. Greyhound Corp., 588 A.2d 485 (1991).
138. Still others would argue that the homeowner sold his home in fee simple and
bought a contract right for himself, which was the investor's promise to not sell the
property before the homeowner's buyback date, and has no property right in the prop-
erty at all. Either way, the repurchase option is something of value to the homeowner.
Much of the argument against the traditional categorization of options as valid execu-
tory interests has centered on whether the option violates the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties. This is not a consideration here as the options in RSLB transaction are of short
(under twenty-one years), pre-defined duration. See William Berg, Jr., Long Term
Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities - Part 11,37 CAL. L. REV. 235, 244 (1949);
see also Phillips v. Tetzner, 53 A.2d 129, 131 (Penn. 1947); Rice v. Wood, 346
S.E.2d 205, 211 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); In re Competrol Acquisition P'ship, L.P., 203
B.R. 914, 917-18 (D. Del. 1996); Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 973 A.2d 1229, 1242
(Conn. 2009); Harley v. Indian Spring Land Co., 3 A.3d 992, 1004-05 (Conn. Ct.
App.201O).
139. The transferability of the option is a term that is of no benefit to the second-
ary investor because it increases the chance that somebody will exercise the option
when the market value is above the option strike price, thereby cutting off the second-
ary investor's access to the extra equity over and above the strike price; however, it is
a balancing aspect of the transaction and it is a value-creating opportunity in this
transaction for the homeowner.
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to repurchase would generate additional capital for the homeowner, who
could sell the option for any amount up to the difference between the strike
price and the higher market value.
F. What Happens to the Equity?
There is significant misunderstanding about where the equity goes in
RSLB transactions. 140 The following example demonstrates one possibility
of how the funds may be distributed in an RSLB transaction, including the
allocation of the investor's expenses, overhead, and payments on the home-
owner's behalf. 14 1 Each party's possible reward reflects his potential risk.
Simple Mathematical Example 142
Starting Value of the Home: $100
Past Due/Foreclosure Amount: $ 70
1st Sale to Investor: $ 80
2nd Sale to Secondary Investor: $ 95
Buyback/Strike Price: $110
Expected Value in Future: $120
In this example, the homeowner has $30 ($100 minus $70) of trapped
equity. Foreclosure would cost the homeowner most, ifnot all, of this equity.
The RSLB transaction allows this homeowner to capture a negotiated portion
of this equity - in this case $10 - plus non-cash benefits. The second sale to
the secondary investor must be priced below the market value to be competi-
tive. If this transaction were priced at market value, the secondary investor
would be indifferent, at best, between this transaction and all other market-
priced opportunities, which would not help this homeowner. Indeed, the sec-
ondary investor might disfavor this transaction because it can come with extra
compliance requirements due to legislation regarding the sale of homes in
foreclosure.l''" In order for the secondary investor to complete the stabilizing
140. Investors are accused of offering terms which are onerous to homeowners
and which ensure that the property or the underlying equity will end up with the in-
vestors. The core of this criticism must be the general uneasiness that critics have
with investors' taking what the critics perceive as too large of a share of the trapped
equity. However, it is impossible to quantify what a fair price is in a market like this.
It is clear that investors receive a large portion of equity in these transactions. If it
can be accepted as a general starting point that these are high-risk transactions and
high-risk homeowners, as evidenced by lenders' unwillingness to lend to these home-
owners again, it is clear then that investors are going to engage in this socially-
beneficial contract only if the reward premium at least matches the risk.
141. These numbers are hypothetical and are gross of any taxes to which the par-
ties may be subject.
142. See also infra Figure 1 (presenting the calculation in a chart).
143. Equity Purchase statutes govern the behavior of investors in these transac-
tions. See, e.g., CAL. Cry. CODE §§ 2945.1-11, 1695.1-17 (West 2014) (outlining
equity purchases procedures, including required language and content of documents
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transaction at a below market price, the sale to the investor must be complet-
ed at a price even below that. The buyback price ($110) is set based on the
parties' expectations of where the property value will be ($120) at the time of
the buyback.
From these numbers, if the home goes up in value as expected during
the leaseback period (to $120), the homeowner has several options from
which to choose. 144 If he does not exercise the option, he gets his original
$10 ($80 minus $70) and walks away. In addition, the homeowner will have
benefited from a fully paid off mortgage, maintenance of his credit, a subsi-
dized rent payment during the leaseback period, and other bills paid off.
Sweetening the deal for the homeowner, if he chooses not to exercise his
repurchase option he may still sell it to another buyer for up to $9.99, leaving
the homeowner with $19.99 ($10 plus $9.99). An unrelated buyer would pay
up to $9.99 for the option to buy the property at $10 below market price. 145 If
the homeowner chooses instead to exercise the option, he will receive at least
$20 (his original $10, added to $120 minus $110). Ifthe home's value rises
past $120, the homeowner also captures the entire gain above $120.
Whether the homeowner exercises the option or not, the investor gets a
maximum of $15 ($95 minus $80, less costs). While the investor secures his
payment early in the transaction, his upside is capped at $15. His downside is
not limited and will depend on the carrying costs incurred during the lease-
back period. For the leaseback period, the investor and the secondary inves-
tor will negotiate the split of the carrying costs and payment of fees related to
the transaction. These costs will come out of their share of the mobilized
equity. It is impossible to know the extent of the carrying costs at the time of
the original sale from the homeowner. If they underestimate, the added costs
are borne by the investors. 146 Additionally, some portion of the equity re-
ceived by the investor and secondary investor would be distributed to their
overhead and compliance costs, including staff and office space.
If the home value rises as expected (to $120) and the homeowner or an
assignee exercises the option at $110, the secondary investor gets a maximum
of $15 ($110 minus $95, less costs). If the option lapses instead, the second-
ary investor gets $25 ($120 minus $95, less costs). If the home's value rises
past $120, the secondary investor enjoys the gain above $120. However, if
the home remains flat during the leaseback period, the secondary investor
used in the process); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-105 to -113, 7-301 to -325
(West 2014); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 407.935-.943; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
19.134.010-.900.
144. If the property value remains flat or declines, it would be rational for the
homeowner not to exercise the option.
145. This hypothetical excludes any transactions costs the buyer of the option
would incur either in purchasing the option from the homeowner or in purchasing the
property from the secondary investor.
146. These costs, if known, can be paid or set aside in escrow at the time of the
original sale. If the costs are unknown and unforeseeable, investor or secondary in-
vestor will pay them from their share of the equity.
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would sell the property and get a maximum of $5 ($100 minus $95, less
costs). Ifthe home declines in value or the leaseback carrying costs are ex-
cessive, the secondary investor risks an incalculable loss (if he is left holding
a home with plummeting market value and stable or rising carrying costs).
Figure 1
Homeowner Investor Secondary Investor
Forectosure!" $0 $0 $0
$lO+Non-Cash Benefits
Declines Below $100 $15-Costs Incalculable Loss
Won 'I Exercise
$lO+Non-Cash Benefits
Flat at $100 $I5-Costs $5-Costs
Won 'I Exercise
HO Exercises: HO Exercises:
$lO+Non-Cash Benefits $15-Costs
Rises to Strike Price $100 $I5-Costs
HO Doesn't Exercise: HO Doesn't Exercise:
$lO+Non-Cash Benefits $15-Costs
HO Exercises: HO Exercises:$20+Non-Cash Benefits $15-Costs
Rises to $120 HO Doesn't Exercise: $I5-Costs
$19.99+Non-Cash HO Doesn't Exercise:
Benefits $25-Costs
HO Exercises:
$20+Non-Cash HO Exercises:
Benefits+Upside $I5-Costs
Rises Beyond $120 $I5-Costs
HO Doesn't Exercise: HO Doesn't Exercise:
$19.99+Non-Cash $25-Costs+ Upside
Benefits
147. In the case of foreclosure, the homeowner would get $0 and the lender would
get $50-plus, if the market value increased as expected. The lender would continue to
profit until the market value fell below $70, at which point the lender would finally
see a loss.
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These values do not include the intangible benefits to the homeowner,
such as foreclosure avoidance, credit maintenance, subsidized rent, tax bene-
fits, insurance, and other carrying costs. These values should also be com-
pared to the values if the homeowner did not have access to this transaction
and lost the home to foreclosure instead. In that example, the homeowner,
investor, and secondary investor would each get $0. The lender, however,
would get $50-plus, if the market value increased as expected. The lender
would continue to profit until the market value fell below $70, at which point
the lender would finally see a loss. If the homeowner bought the home back
under the statutory right of redemption - assuming that is available in his
jurisdiction - he would have to pay back the foreclosure amount, as well as
the fees and expenses of the bank. 148
IV. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES
A. Benefits
As demonstrated above, a homeowner can receive many tangible and in-
tangible benefits in RSLB transactions. The immediate benefit to the home-
owner is access to at least some of his equity, especially at a time when there
is no other market mechanism available to him to access any of that equity.
With the proceeds from the sale of the home going to the investor, a home-
owner is able to avoid an immediate foreclosure as the mortgage is paid off at
the closing table. Often homeowners also are able to avoid bankruptcy by
using the cash extracted to get current on their consumer debts.
Avoiding the foreclosure allows the homeowner to regain stability and
certainty: he can keep his children in their schools and avoid the cost and
inconvenience of having to find new housing and relocate all of his family's
possessions. The homeowner gets mental and emotional benefits as well. He
is spared the humiliation of a foreclosure and eviction and is able to get his
name off of the negative public records. In fact, even if he never repurchases
the property, the homeowner will not have a foreclosure on his credit history.
The RSLB allows a homeowner to retain what is left of his credit rating.
Further, the homeowner is able to eliminate the stress and pressure of a loom-
ing foreclosure. The leaseback period gives the homeowner an opportunity to
make important decisions in a less chaotic timeframe. He also avoids the cost
and inconvenience of maintenance, insurance, and taxes during the leaseback
period.
148. The average foreclosure is estimated to cost $78,000 and to take two years to
complete; Bank ofAmerica Starts Foreclosure Rental Program, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Mar. 23, 2012, 2:24 P.M.), http://www.suntimes.com/business/l1489245-420/bank-
of-america-starts-foreclosure-rental-program.html; see also Mortg. Bankers Ass'n,
supra note 61 (putting the cost of foreclosure at thirty to sixty percent of the outstand-
ing loan balance).
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Another benefit to the homeowner is that he insulates himself against
home price risk. Even if he could have avoided the foreclosure on his own,
the homeowner has an incentive to do an RSLB because it allows him to shift
price risk to the investors. If the homeowner expects the market to go down
in the near future, he can satisfy two important goals - avoid the foreclosure
and take out equity before the home value plummets. This is a strategy that,
if correct, leaves the investor with property that is declining in value. If the
homeowner thinks the market is going to increase in value, he is preserving a
chance to regain his American Dream in the future under clearly spelled-out
terms and conditions - certainty which he would not have in the event of a
foreclosure and redemption attempt. That chance is a valuable one, which
leaves him better off than not having had the chance, even if the repurchase
does not come to fruition.
B. Challenges
Although the RSLB is generally a valuable transaction for homeowners
and investors, there are aspects of it that can go wrong or that homeowners or
investors can exploit to the detriment of the other. 149 In order to preserve this
transaction as a viable option for certain homeowners, it is important to keep
sight of where problems can arise in order to protect against these scenarios.
However, most - if not all - of these possible pitfalls can be avoided relative-
ly easily. The goal of this section is not to provide solutions to all of these
problems; rather, it is to acknowledge them as areas that must be observed
carefully and resolved to prevent problems. ISO
The problems fall into several broad categories: problems of
(mis)understanding and inadequate counsel, landlord-tenant disputes during
the leaseback period, actual and falsely alleged fraud, shortcomings in the
governing statutes, and disempowered civil judges constrained by inadequate
remedies due to weak contract doctrine.
The first major area of risk in these transactions for both homeowners
and investors is lack of information, understanding, and disclosure. There is
the risk that homeowners do not understand the contracts and inherent risks
of the transaction, and that they overestimate the likelihood of being able to
149. It is impossible to know what percentage of these transaction go well, leav-
ing both parties satisfied, because those transactions are never exposed. Instead, the
few problematic transactions surface and appear to represent the norm. Michelle
Hoffman, It's Scam Season: Scrambling to Avoid Foreclosure, More Owners Fall
Prey to Rescue Fraud, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/
2007/sepI09/realestate/re-foreclose9 (citing one 2007 estimate, in which a supervising
investigator for the Los Angeles County Department of Consumer Affairs said that
her office had seen about fifty cases involving some type of foreclosure scam, at a
time when 4000 notices of default were published monthly, and the investigator ex-
pected the number of notices to triple over the following year).
150. For a more thorough examination of the possible problems, including sug-
gested solutions, see Harvey, supra note 15.
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repurchase their homes. 151 On the other hand, there is the risk that investors
also may not understand the risks that they bear,152 the laws in their jurisdic-
tions regarding such purchases.P" or the likely behaviors of the homeowners
during the various phases of the contract. 154 There are often costly problems
with the homes in terms of unknown title defects and other hidden mainte-
nance defects that may be devastating for investors; some of these problems
are known by the homeowners, but are not disclosed. 155
The other closely related area of risk is the homeowners' and investors'
lack of access to legal counsel and their reliance on inadequate advice. Alt-
hough not a problem that is unique to RSLB transactions, access to counsel
and the decision to obtain counsel is critical in this process for homeowners.
Indeed it is a systemic problem from which homeowners suffer during the
RSLB transaction, during the larger foreclosure process and during most
transactions in which homeowners engage. If the statutory provisions built
into the RSLB transaction still do not provide meaningful opportunity or in-
centive for homeowners to seek and obtain counsel, that problem must be
addressed. Currently, it is undeniable that homeowners often do not take
advantage of this opportunity. Homeowners need counsel prior to signing the
contracts, at the time of the initial closing, during the leaseback period ifthere
are landlord-tenant issues, and, potentially, after the contract concludes,
whether or not the homeowner repurchases his home. Solutions to this prob-
lem would involve getting the best counsel and advice prior to the initial sale,
as most of the allegations of investor wrongdoing pertain to actions taken
prior to the signing of the original contracts. Solutions in this area must be
preemptive. Currently, homeowners rely on the services of legal aid organi-
zations and the prosecutor after the fact, which are both too late and too ex-
pensive.
151. For a discussion of optimism bias, see Alan M. White, Behavior and Con-
tract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 159 (2009).
152. The risks inherent in RSLB transactions for investors are similar to the risks
inherent in all equity-conversion products, such as reverse mortgages and shared
appreciation mortgages, to name a few. The difference between the RSLB market-
place and those markets is that much economic and financial scholarship has been
dedicated to addressing risk in those other markets, whereas RSLB has encountered
very little scholarship. For a good discussion of the risks of the equity-conversion
product market, see Shiller & Weiss, supra note 113.
153. Many jurisdictions have Equity Purchase Statutes, which govern the sale of
properties that are in or approaching foreclosure. RSLB transactions would be gov-
erned by such statutes. It is within these statutory frameworks that this Article sug-
gests the easiest changes to the RSLB transaction can be made. See supra note 143.
154. Two related, major risks to investors in these transactions are homeowner
moral hazard and adverse selection. For a good discussion of these risks, see Shiller
& Weiss, supra note 113.
155. As in any real estate sale, the seller has an incentive to not disclose known
defects for fear of depressing the sale price. In this case, the incentive is even greater
because homeowners may hope that the investor will be required to fix the defect as
landlord during the leaseback period.
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There also is, however, a lack-of-access problem suffered by the inves-
tors in these cases. Because these are generally small investment firms, they
may be most likely to obtain legal advice through seminars and books. They
may use form contracts, instead of customized contracts, due to the cost and
the volume of transactions required to be profitable. Investors must also be-
come educated to avoid mistakes related to overpromising, puffing, and ag-
gressive salesmanship. Finally, small investors who face criminal or civil
accusations brought by private or legal aid lawyers on behalf of homeowners
are least able to afford defense counsel; such investors are likely to end up
with public defenders, who may not be equipped to put on adequate defenses
in complicated financial cases that allege fraud and are based on contracts and
extra-contractual discussions. Solutions in this area would involve the inves-
tors developing legal strategies and pricing the cost of those strategies into
their operations prior to entering into contracts with homeowners.
Landlord-tenant disputes are another source of risk in these transactions.
Because the investors take over the maintenance and expense of the proper-
ties during the leaseback period, maintenance issues can become contentious.
Additionally, if there is an eviction process at the end of the transaction, it
can become hostile and expensive. Solutions here would come in the form of
better leases with clearer parameters for maintenance and dispute resolution.
Allegations of fraud are perhaps the riskiest and most expensive threat
to investors in these cases. However, homeowners are at risk in this area as
well if they fail to make legally required disclosures at the time of the initial
sale to the investors. While cases so far do not involve investor claims
against homeowners, it is a wise bet that investors will start bringing such
suits and countersuits as civil and criminal allegations against investors gain
momentum. More pressing is the need to avoid this risk for investors. Alle-
gations of fraud are not generally related to the terms of the written contract,
nor do they tend to allege that the contract was not performed as written. 156
Instead, these charges usually involve allegations of extra-contractual conver-
sations that promised or explained something other than what the contract
said (i.e. - "He never told me I was selling my home and becoming a rent-
er."). Because the factual underpinnings of these cases involve alleged con-
versations between the homeowner and investor, it is critical that solutions in
this area involve stronger contracts, education of the homeowners and inves-
156. In the few cases in which the investors intentionally do not perform the con-
tracts as written, those cases more closely resemble a fraudulent breach and may pro-
vide greater grounds for criminal regulation. One purely fraudulent example of not
executing the contract as written occurs when investors promise that they will payoff
the foreclosure at the time of the initial sale and then maintain that they have paid off
the foreclosure for some portion of the leaseback period, but have not. In these
fraudulent cases, the homeowner sometimes still catapults towards foreclosure un-
knowingly and criminal regulation may be warranted. However, even this problem
can be easily preempted.
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tors, clearer disclosures, pre-contractual access to counsel, and effective parol
evidence standards. 157
Another risk arises in the very way that homeowners in these cases are
found. Generally, one homeowner goes into the offices of a legal services
organization with a problem in his RSLB transaction - usually that he is fac-
ing eviction and cannot repurchase his property.P" Suspecting fraud, that
organization then typically conducts a search of the public records to find the
other homeowners with whom the investor has transacted. 159 The legal aid
group will often contact the additional homeowners and ask them to come in
to have their cases reviewed for fraud. Without these calls, it is unlikely that
these homeowners would bring charges; however, after the call, they have an
interest and motive in alleging that they have been defrauded or that they did
not understand what they were getting into. Solutions in this area must be
preemptive and the ability of legal aid-type organizations to rally plaintiffs
must be closely monitored.i'"
There are also general shortcomings in the governing statutes that could
be resolved easily. For example, one problem in these transactions that has
emerged is that the secondary investor might sell the property to a bona fide
purchaser who is not aware of the homeowner's right to repurchase the
horne.'?' When the homeowner attempts to repurchase his home, he is told
that there is a new owner, and that the new owner does not want to honor the
homeowner's repurchase option. 162 This leads to problems that could be
avoided if the statute required that the repurchase option be recorded as an
encumbrance on title at the time of the original recording of the larger trans-
action. Unbelievably, recording is not always required. 163
157. If the criminal courts are to be effective in policing this area, they must be
bound by the same parol evidence rules as the civil courts.
158. FORECLOSURES, supra note 9, at ch. 15.
159. Due to the transparency of real estate transactions and recording require-
ments, finding other homeowners is a very simple process.
160. See Robert L. Weinberg, Iqbalfor the Accused, 34 CHAMPION 28, NACDL
MAGAZINE (July 2010) (arguing that standards at least as high as the newly-
heightened pleading standards given to civil defendants in Twombly and Iqbal should
be used at the indictment and preliminary hearing stage to protect criminal defend-
ants, who are "concerned with preserving liberty, not just assets").
161. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695.14(b)&(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 16 of 2014
Reg. Sess.).
162. FORECLOSURES, supra note 9, at ch. 15. However, these cases show that
some homeowners can and do wish to repurchase their homes after an RSLB transac-
tion, although a common argument is that homeowners can never repurchase their
homes due to the terms.
163. Currently, California does not specifically require the recording of the repur-
chase option, which, in effect creates a burden on the option holder to keep abreast of
the recorded transfers of the property and to then notify subsequent purchasers that he
holds that option. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1695-1695.15. This burden is directly at
odds with protecting homeowners.
2014] WE BUYHOUSES 411
The final major area of risk emerges because of the still unavailable
contract doctrines needed to reach civil disposition of these cases. Civil
judges must be empowered once again to provide adequate civil remedies for
these homeowners as well as predictable frameworks for the investors. 164
v. CONCLUSION
Despite the negative reputation of the We Buy Houses and other RSLB
transactions, this Article demonstrates that the transactions fill two important
market and social goals. First, the transactions are financially and socially
beneficial to the homeowners and communities that use them. Specifically,
the homeowner, whose only other option is foreclosure, receives more of his
equity than he could in the foreclosure process, in which the bank likely
would claim all of the equity as fees. This remains true even where the
homeowner ultimately is unable to repurchase his home at the buyback date.
Even with the most pro-homeowner legislation, large banks are still able to
refuse to refinance certain homeowners. For this reason, there will always be
an unfortunate group of homeowners who need a last-ditch solution.
Without RSLB investors, these homeowners would lose their homes and
equity immediately and certainly. With the RSLB investor, the homeowner
has at least a chance of salvaging his home and pulling out some of his equi-
ty. It is that chance for which a homeowner bargains and for which a home-
owner pays. For the homeowner, in the simple mathematical example
above.i'" the RSLB transaction gave him access to at least ten dollars of his
equity, and possibly more; on the other hand, the foreclosure scenario left
him with nothing. Ten dollars is not a bad outcome when compared to zero,
and homeowners know this.
Second, the transactions play an integral role in the overall real estate
market by filling voids that the large banks cannot fill. Large banks are con-
strained by operational realities based on their size that make managing such
high-risk loans an inefficient undertaking for them. The RSLB marketplace
allows small, nimble investors to service these homeowners instead.
While there may be legitimate problems with the transaction, the bene-
fits of the transaction make the transaction worth salvaging instead of oblite-
rating. The benefits of the transaction include, but are not limited to, access
to otherwise inaccessible home equity, stability and autonomy, maintenance
of one's credit rating, reduced stress, protection against home price risk, and
benefits to reputation.
The challenges are that unscrupulous homeowners and investors can ex-
ploit one another. Compounding that problem, either side may not have
meaningful access to counsel in the contract drafting phase of the transaction,
leading to misunderstanding and unfair deal terms. Additionally, landlord-
164. Additionally, investors must be estopped from avoiding paying judgments
through bankruptcy and othermeans.
165. See supra Figure 1.
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tenant problems may arise during the leaseback period, for which either side
again may not have adequate access to counsel. Indeed, the challenges can be
easily dealt with using preemptive and remedial measures, which leave the
parties and society better off.
This Article details the anatomy of the often misunderstood transaction,
highlighting the value added from the transaction versus other options the
homeowner may have. The Article also includes a sample accounting of the
flow of dollars through the transaction, demonstrating how much better off
the homeowner can be compared to the foreclosure that was avoided by doing
the transaction. This accounting also shows that the biggest risk-taker in the
transaction, the secondary investor, also rightly has the opportunity to reap
the biggest reward. Finally, the Article outlines the benefits and challenges
inherent in the RSLB marketplace, thereby laying a foundation for subse-
h h . 166quent researc on t e tOPIC.
166. See Harvey, supra note 15, at Part IV.
